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This study offers a new approach to understanding the diffusion of a new technology; specifically on the 
process of information sharing and its influence on a market based standards contest. Since diffusion 
relies upon adopting firms to gather information and learn about a new technology prior to adoption, 
communication of a technology’s attributes and benefits is essential to the overall process of diffusion. 
The flow of information from sponsors to adopters is an influential action that serves to impact both the 
speed and degree of adoption of a new technology and can influence the outcome of market based 
standards contest.  I explore these issues through a case analysis of the wireless phone industry and the 
2G standards contest in the United States by studying the information sharing actions and events of two 
technology sponsors; Ericsson and Qualcomm.  I develop a model of information sharing that identifies 
how aspects of timing, message, media, and target of influence combine to form two primary types of 
information sharing; cascade and broadcast. This model draws on concepts from the relevant body of 
literature on standards contests, social networks and communication theories.   
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1.0 THE SETTING OF TECHNOLOGY STANDARDS 
 
 
 
 
Technology diffusion is a process whereby new innovations associated with products, processes, or 
management techniques spread throughout a market or economy (Karshenas & Stoneman, 1995).  The 
spread of these new ideas can take several years or even decades.  Since diffusion relies upon adopting 
firms to gather information and learn about a new technology prior to adoption, communication of a 
technology’s attributes and benefits is essential to the overall process of diffusion. This communication is 
primarily the role of technology sponsors but is also undertaken by early adopters as they attempt to 
sway undecided participants by publicizing their decisions.  Either way the flow of information from 
sponsors to adopters either directly or through other industry participants is an influential action that 
serves to impact both the speed and degree of adoption of a new technology.   
The literature on technology diffusion has devoted very little attention to another process by which 
technologies spread; standards contests.  Standards contests occur when two or more firms are vying to 
establish the market dominance of competing technologies to become a de facto market standard 
(Shapiro & Varian, 1999).  Most research into the factors that influence technology diffusion has focused 
on characteristics of the technologies such as risks, returns, complexity, and intellectual property; and on 
the characteristics of the adopting firms, such as their size, access to capital, expected returns from new 
technologies, factor productivity, search costs, and input prices (Mansfield, 1968 & 1989; Romeo, 1977; 
David, 1969 & 1991; Davies, 1979; Karshenas & Stoneman, 1993).  There has been little research to 
investigate the actions of technology sponsors as a central driver of technology diffusion, especially on 
how the sharing of information influences the adoption behavior of key industry participants.   This is 
particularly crucial in a standards contest because the nature of competing technologies highlights the 
process of information sharing.   
 7/25/2006   2
An industry standard is a set of specifications to which all elements of products, processes, 
formats, or procedures under its jurisdiction must conform (Tassey, 2000).   Standards can be selected 
by a politically driven standards organization or accepted as de facto by the market.  Standards contests 
are an integral component of industries characterized by technological innovation and involve the 
codification of an element of an industry’s technology (Tassey, 2000).  Technology standards have long 
been important elements of market competition, because acquiring a dominant standard is a critical 
determinant of a firm’s long-term competitive position and success (Hill, 1997; Funk, 2003).   
The sponsoring of a technical standard is an important strategic activity by the firm.  Developing a 
dominant standard involves large irrevocable commitments of resources, has an uncertain outcome that 
is determined by a complex set of uncontrollable factors, and has an outcome with lasting consequences 
for a firm.   Standard setting is a collaborative activity among manufacturers, governments, and service 
providers, who work in complex, interconnected, and dynamic environments (Leiponen, 2005). 
Standard setting is a process of adoption and diffusion.  The diffusion of an innovation involves 
communicating characteristics of a new innovation to a group of potential adopters.  As these parties 
gain familiarity with the innovation and are persuaded of its benefits, they decide to adopt it.  Both the 
perceived attributes of an innovation and the type of innovation-decision − characteristics associated with 
the environment, the nature of the communication channels that technology sponsors use to convey 
information to potential adopters, and the extent of their overall efforts in diffusing the innovation − 
affect the overall rate of adoption (Rogers, 1995).  A new technical standard is an innovation that is 
introduced and diffused into a society of potential users.  The process of standard setting is a special kind 
of diffusion, one that requires understanding the actions and distinctive nature of both adopters and 
technology sponsors.  Standard setting can take many years and involve complex and interrelated actions 
and transfers of information by both sponsors and adopters. The cumulative effect of such actions usually 
determines what standard prevails; rarely does one specific action or event determine the outcome.   
What does it take to win a standards war? The industrial standards literature overwhelmingly 
focuses on market share as the primary indicator of whether a standard has achieved dominance and 
hence which firm has won the contest (Shapiro & Varian, 1999; Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Farrell & Saloner, 
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1985; Funk, 2003).  This literature assumes that firm behavior and network externalities effect a single 
standard’s gaining dominance.  However, when the technical capabilities of one standard are not 
sufficient to satisfy the market, multiple standards can coexist for an extended period of time in a 
standards contest.  In this case there are multiple winners, and even though market share remains a 
determinant of success, it loses its importance in isolating one standard as a clear winner.  Since a 
standards contest can evolve over years, even decades, a single contest can go through periods when 
multiple standards coexist and when a winner is or is not clearly recognizable.         
How best to influence this process of standard setting is a strategic decision faced by many firms.  
Certain strategic behaviors are critical for success, especially in industries characterized by intensive 
capital investment and lock-in.  Where network externalities are present, the number of users directly 
affects the value of the technology, and obtaining a large market share early in a standards contest can 
ensure dominance. Thus, first-mover advantage and attainment of critical size are recognized strategies 
for obtaining a dominant standard (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988; Farrell & Saloner, 1986; Katz & 
Shapiro, 1994; Shapiro & Varian, 1999).  Public debates over a standard’s technical and social factors are 
another means a firm uses to influence the selection process of a technological standard (David, 1987).  
These debates are an attempt to reduce the uncertainty associated with selecting the standard that 
becomes pervasive and hence are also a method for a firm to influence adopters’ choices.  Strategic 
alliances act as mechanisms for sharing knowledge and reducing the risk of innovative activity.   They 
can be undertaken by firms with the intent of influencing the outcome of a standards contest 
(Rosenbloom & Cusumano, 1987; Rosenkopf & Tushman, 1998).   
Since diffusion of a new innovation requires extensive communication of its attributes, the type of 
information regarding a technical standard that adopters acquire can strongly influence their desire to 
select a standard (Das & Van de Ven, 2000). Firms can and do share information about their technologies 
in order to influence the adoption process.  The type and timing of persuasion can determine a 
technology sponsor’s influence over key adopters.  These adopters consist of other firms in the market, 
standard bodies, and government departments.  Technology sponsors seek to influence key adopters’ 
expectations before competing technologies have a chance to attract widespread support.  This process 
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must be initiated before either the technology or the market is fully developed.  Sponsors risk losing the 
battle by sharing information that cannot be rapidly factualized or by selecting a flawed target.      
Prior research recognizes that communication is a critical requirement for diffusion of a new 
technology, but few studies have investigated how communication − or more specifically, the process of 
information sharing − affects the process of standard setting, that is, how the evolution of a technology 
is linked to the type of message that a firm delivers and how this message can influence an adopter’s 
choice.  Technology sponsors in a standards contest are caught between a need to display the benefits of 
their technology in a timely manner to dissuade competition, and the risk of raising early expectations 
that later become difficult to meet or unnecessary due to changes in the environment (Shapiro & Varian, 
1999).  At the beginning of the information sharing process, adopters are uncertain about the technical 
capabilities and marketability of the competing standards.  It is critical for technology sponsors to 
communicate sufficient information regarding their standards to reduce this uncertainty and drive 
adoption, without releasing so much information that competitors can leverage it.  This is the essence of 
an information sharing strategy: determining what type of information to share, how to share, with whom 
to share, and the optimal timing of this sharing for influencing key adopters.   Even though the standards 
literature provides some insights into effective strategies to influence adoption in a standards contest, it 
has focused on individual tactics, not on a series of actions that comprise a strategy and over time 
influence the selection process.  There remains room in the literature to improve our understanding of a 
firm’s standardization strategies; specifically how the communication of information delivered at different 
time in the standards process influences the adoption of a new technology.    
This study intends to provide insights into the information sharing process used by firms to 
influence key adopters in a technical standards contest, primarily on the actions and events that occur in 
a market-based or de-facto process.  Standards contests that are market based involve two or more firms 
vying for dominance (Shapiro & Varian, 1999).  This study also investigates how network externalities 
can increase the significance of the outcome of the contest for all firms concerned.  The extent of 
network externalities’ influence depends partly upon the value accrued in the installed base.  Even though 
the literature assumes that the presence of network externalities results in a single winning standard, the 
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strength of the externality affects both the speed and the overall degree of dominance (Arthur, 1988; 
Quelin, Abdessemed, Bonardi, & Durand, 2001).   
At the beginning of a contest and at many other points along the way, it may be difficult for firms 
to recognize that a single dominant standard will eventually emerge.  Only as the competing technologies 
adapt to the needs of the market, does it become increasingly transparent which standard will 
subsequently dominate.  Therefore adopters must overcome uncertainty by obtaining information in 
order to lessen the risk of making the wrong selection.  
These are the main questions that will be explored in this study: Do firms use distinctive strategies 
for the sharing of information within a standards contest, and when do they use these strategies?  Do 
these strategies change as the standards contest evolves?  In addition I provide some observations 
regarding how characteristics of the firms and the technologies impact this process of information 
sharing.  The intention is to gain a greater understanding of how and when the strategic sharing of 
information to potential adopters and competitors serves to influence the adoption of a technical 
standard. 
I have selected the telecommunications industry because it is one in which standards play an 
important role.  Standards battles are a key focus of competition in this industry, and the stakes 
associated with supporting one standard over another are significant.  Increased demand for global 
communications via wireless devices, especially for data delivery, is creating the need for global 
standards for inter-network compatibility.  Greater complexity associated with both terminals and 
infrastructure increases the requirement for common standards in the wireless arena.  
Telecommunication standards tend to become entrenched due to the capital-intensive nature of the 
network and the high R&D cost associated with standard development.  All of these reasons, along with 
the presence of network effects in this industry, generate dominant standards and serve to increase the 
complexity and strategic value associated with the selection of a standard.     
Since standard setting can be a time-intensive process with many influences, it is necessary to look 
at sequences of actions to infer that a particular strategy for sharing information is being used.  A single 
information sharing event is insufficient to discern a firm’s strategy for influencing adoption.  Therefore I 
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have selected a longitudinal case methodology to establish the influence of information sharing on 
standard setting.    
The case study will be based primarily on the events and activities evident within the second 
generation (2G) digital wireless standards contest in the United States.  This was primarily a market-
based standards process and offers an interesting comparison between technical standards that differ on 
key strategic attributes like technical ability and market readiness.  I look for variation in both the 
message associated with these characteristics and when it is delivered.  Finally, this case offers an 
instructive context since it already took place, allowing the end result of the strategies deployed to be 
discerned through the contest’s outcome.  Even though the focus is on the American process, I will also 
include some aspects of the European 2G digital wireless standard setting process that impacted the U.S. 
contest.    
In order to recognize distinctive information sharing strategies, their key elements need to be 
identified.  The literature on positive network externalities and standard setting suggest that “timing” is 
crucial.  Therefore, timing of technology sponsors’ choosing to share information is of substantive interest 
in this analysis.  Das and Van de Ven (2000) suggest that the “target” of influence may include 
organizations besides the ultimate technology users.  Research on technology diffusion and networks 
indicates that the choice of “message” and the “media” used to convey information are also important.   
These literature streams contribute to the identification of important aspects associated with a firm’s 
information sharing strategy in a standards contest and are important to the development of a model that 
attempts to more clearly define how and when firms share information.  
The case study highlights the activities and events associated with two key firms: Ericsson, a 
European manufacturer of telecom equipment and primary developer and sponsor of both the GSM and 
TDMA digital wireless standards; and Qualcomm, a U.S. based manufacturer and sponsor of the CDMA 
digital standard.  Both firms actively participated in the 2nd generation (2G) standards contest in the 
United States, and the majority of the data that will be assessed relates to activities and events visible in 
a de-facto standards process.  At the same time, certain events and actions that also occurred through 
their interactions on standard setting committees are also of interest in this study because they affect the 
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outcome.  The development of 2G in the United States was somewhat intertwined with its development 
elsewhere, which means that understanding the interactions of both Ericsson and Qualcomm with 
network operators worldwide is necessary to assessing the impact of strategic information sharing on 
standard selection for this market.     
I use the literature to derive two distinctive information sharing strategies available to technology 
sponsors, and predict when each strategy would be relied upon.  Specifically, I predict that firms will use 
a cascade strategy early in a standards contest and will then shift to a broadcast strategy as the contest 
evolves.  This involves understanding when technology sponsors will share complex versus simple 
information, when they target an entire community versus individual members, and when they use mass 
media versus personal channels.  I extend the literature by using the types of information being shared, 
to identify distinct eras within the standard setting process.  Although the literature identifies distinct 
stages of diffusion, during which the use of information sharing may influence adoption, it misses key 
elements associated with when and how this information is shared.  I use the concept of eras to capture 
important patterns in the information sharing strategies that firms use.  I also offer preliminary 
observations on information strategies and their relationship to characteristics of firms and technologies.    
I will begin by providing the relevant aspects of the communication of information evident within 
the literature on technology diffusion, detailing the applicable facets of the standards literature, focusing 
on firm actions in market based standards contests, and proffering pertinent features of the literature on 
social network theories.  This summation of relevant theory will explore how a firm’s strategic behavior is 
driven by timing, target of influence, message, and media.  I arrive at a model of strategic information 
sharing that links stages in a technical standards process with tie strength and information content in 
order to differentiate cascade, which exploits a firm’s relationships, from broadcast, which relies upon the 
use of mass media and other intermediaries.  The focus of the model is information sharing within the 
confines of a technical standards battle differentiated by the type of message communicated, the manner 
in which it is delivered, and the timing associated with its release.  Timing arises as the key component of 
the model, especially as it relates to a standard setting process. 
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2.0 REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
 
 
 
 
Three main bodies of literature are relevant to this study.   First, the diffusion literature, with its focus on 
the communication of an innovation’s attributes and how the spread of messages impacts the speed and 
the extent of diffusion throughout a community, provides the framework for this investigation into how 
the sharing of information influences adoption.  Second, the standards literature − especially portions 
dealing with the importance of information sharing in managing adopters’ expectations, how relationships 
can be exploited to influence the standard process, and how the timing of certain tactics can affect the 
outcome − are also pertinent to understanding how the elements of an information sharing strategy are 
best sequenced.   Finally, the literature on tie strength − since it reveals how a firm’s position in a 
network and the strength of its relationships influence its ability to exchange information − is also 
applicable to developing a model of information sharing.   
This literature review focuses on the content within each of these areas that provides insights into 
market-based standards contests.  In particular, this literature suggests what the key elements of a 
strategy are for a firm sharing information with the intent to influence potential adopters and other 
organizations that play an important role in the selection of a technology standard.  It also suggests how 
information can be most effectively communicated according to its characteristics.   
 
 
 
2.1 THE COMMUNICATION OF DIFFUSION  
 
 
The literature on technology diffusion is primarily concerned with the speed at which firms adopt new 
technologies.  It investigates possible explanations for why one technology is adopted more quickly or 
slowly than a competing technology, based on the individual choices of adopters and their perceptions of 
the costs and benefits associated with a given innovation.  The diffusion literature also explores how 
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diffusion occurs through markets and the rational elements of adopters’ choices.  Diffusion models focus 
on the information needs of adopters and assume they have limited information about a new technology 
and that the diffusion of an adoption involves a process of information acquisition.  Four factors influence 
adoption: the innovation itself, the communication channels used to spread information about the 
innovation, time, and the nature of the society to which it is introduced (Rogers, 1995).     
The communication process is an important first step because the diffusion of information can 
bring about recognition, interest, and potential for adoption.  Efficient-choice models of diffusion assume 
that firms adopt innovations based on information about their technical efficiency or profitability.  The 
diffusion literature holds different views regarding whether all firms in the market receive information 
simultaneously, and if so, whether the information is complete or incomplete for all firms (Rosenkopf & 
Abrahamson, 1999).   When a new technology is superior, it is assumed that all firms in a market will 
rapidly adopt it.  However, this is not always the case, perhaps because adopters vary in when they 
become aware of the new technology and its benefits (Geroski, 2000).   
The spread of information about a new technology is critical to determining both the rate and 
degree of adoption.  Therefore, the characteristics of a new technology and the degree to which adopters 
are aware of and satisfied by the information they acquire determine the rate of adoption.  The greater 
the perceived relative advantage of a new technology, the more rapid will be its adoption.  The more 
compatible a technology is with the values and norms of the social system, the easier it will be for 
adopters to accept it.  If adopters perceive the technology to be difficult to understand and use, this will 
slow adoption.  The extent to which adopters can experiment with a new technology also affects their 
propensity to adopt, and if the benefits of a new technology are clearly observable, adoption will be more 
rapid (Rogers, 1995).  These characteristics relate to how well technology sponsors are able to effectively 
communicate the benefits and advantages of their technology and to the timeliness of their sharing 
important information with appropriate parties.     
Recognizing that communication of information to a specified target in a timely manner is a 
fundamental tenet to effective diffusion, I extend this premise and apply it to a standard setting contest.  
In a standards contest, firms also acquire information about new technologies, and the quality and timing 
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of delivery for this information has been recognized as critical to gaining a dominant standard.  As with 
the diffusion literature, many questions remain unanswered in the standards literature regarding the type 
of information to be communicated, when to share this information, and the preferred methods of 
delivery that will result in a bandwagon of support.  The extended nature of a standards contest requires 
technology sponsors to also understand how best to share this information throughout a series of actions 
− beginning with activities associated with the conception of the technology and continuing into the 
evolution of subsequent generations.  In essence, information sharing in a standards contest becomes a 
strategic activity for a technology sponsor.  
 
 
 
2.2 STRATEGY AS IT RELATES TO STANDARDS CONTESTS 
 
 
Strategy has been defined as a coherent sequence of actions that have a clear set of objectives, even if 
some aspects of the sequence, such as the precise timing of actions, is emergent (Mintzberg, 1996).  In 
contrast, tactics are single events that affect a competitive dynamic.  Distinctive strategies are thus 
evident in different sequences of actions or in the patterns of actions taken over some time period (Das & 
Van de Ven, 2000).  Strategy also involves making decisions about how best to allocate resources and on 
what activities to direct capabilities in order to achieve superior performance.  A fundamental tenet of 
strategy is that the effective development and leveraging of technological know how often results in 
superior market performance (Rosenbloom & Cusumano, 1987).  Technical standards are central to 
business strategy, and being accepted as the dominant standard in the market can go a long way toward 
ensuring a firm’s success.  Having a successful technology standard involves more than the ability to 
innovate; it requires an understanding of the complex social, political, and commercial interactions among 
all interested parties that influence the outcome in the market (Leiponen, 2005).    
Shapiro and Varian (1999) is one of the few references in the standards literature that investigates 
firm strategy and standards contests.  The authors direct a portion of their analysis to the choices related 
to compatibility among competing technologies.  They classify standards battles according to whether 
they involve evolutionary or revolutionary change.  Evolution offers adopters an easy migration path, 
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whereas revolution offers superior performance.  Shapiro and Varian identify key assets that are required 
to win a standards war.  What is not evident is how these key assets, each of which is merely a tactical 
move a firm can employ, should be sequenced in order to form an effective strategy.       
The process of standard setting can be influenced by many factors.  Rarely can a single action or 
event predicated by a firm, significantly alter the outcome of a standards contest.  Even the literature on 
positive feedback postulates a series of actions or events that eventually force the market to select or tip 
towards one technology (Arthur, 1989).  Committee membership, strategic alliances, co-operative 
agreements, IPR (intellectual property rights), strategic alignment with complementary products, and 
management of expectations are all mentioned in the literature as important strategic actions or tactics 
that influence the standard setting process (Bekkers, Duyster, & Verspagen, 2000; Cusumano, Mylonadis, 
& Rosenbloom, 1992; Hill, 1997; Dokko & Rosenkopf, 2004).  All of these actions share a common 
thread: the information that is shared among their various actors.  The sharing of information through a 
cooperative development agreement, to potential adopters in the market, or to potential manufacturers 
of complementary products, is a significant part of the process that influences their choice.  As with other 
forces that influence standard setting, no single information-sharing event can be credited with industry 
acceptance of a dominant standard, but a series of these information-sharing events can constitute an 
effective strategy.  Thus, information sharing can be considered as a key component of firms’ strategy to 
influence the market and establish their technology as the dominant standard.  
Much of the literature on standards has identified tactics that firms use to affect the outcome of a 
standards contest, but only a few studies have examined strategies.  Elevating the focus of the standards 
literature to a strategic level requires linking effective tactics in a cohesive sequence over time.  While the 
process of information sharing is a common thread that runs through much of the previous literature on 
standard setting, it has not been adequately studied as a strategic action in is own right that can 
influence key adopters expectations.  In this paper, I link a series of information sharing events or actions 
into a coherent strategy that is used by technology sponsors to influence key adopters and initiate the 
adoption process.      
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2.3 STANDARDS CONTESTS – KEY TACTICS 
 
 
Past research efforts have provided some guidance surrounding standards choices and how compatibility 
between technologies, control of intellectual property, and the management of expectations through 
information sharing can influence the outcome of a standards contest (Farrell & Saloner, 1985; Bekkers, 
Duysters, & Verspagen, 2002; Shapiro & Varian, 1999).  This literature recognizes the criticality of 
information on the outcome of standard setting, but is primarily concerned with the tactical nature of how 
this information is exploited by technology sponsors.  The standards literature suggests that the timing of 
certain actions can have a critical influence on the outcome of standards contests.  First-mover 
advantages, positive feedback, installed base, and network externalities are some of the concepts that 
focus on how aspects of timing as it relates to the adoption of high technology products have been 
discussed in the literature (Farrell & Saloner, 1986; Arthur, 1989; Katz & Shapiro, 1994; Shapiro & Varian, 
1999).  First-mover advantages rest on the logic of preemption: build an early lead and reap the benefits 
of positive feedback.  They have been credited as a competitive tactic that results in the acquisition of an 
early installed base and can lead to a technological standard’s gaining market dominance.  Positive 
feedback is the process by which growth in an installed base of end users or the stock of complementary 
products causes more users to adopt the same technology and more firms to develop complementary 
hardware or software.   
Network externalities exist when the value of a particular technology increases exponentially with 
the number of users or with the availability of complementary hardware and software.  Where strong 
network externalities operate, the battle between competing, incompatible technologies is more intense 
because only one can survive and dominate the market.  This may accelerate the processes driving 
adoption and diffusion of a technology.  When network externalities are substantial, the decision of each 
adopter influences others, and this further increases the pressure on technology sponsors to convey the 
right message through the most effective channel to the appropriate targets.  Thus, the strategic use of 
information and the timing associated with its delivery becomes especially critical.      
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This focus on critical mass, although a valuable component of standards theory, does not 
sufficiently address situations where more than one technology continues to thrive.  Recent work has 
uncovered that although early obtainment of an installed base is an important strategic goal in standards 
wars, the strength of a tie between firms can influence technology selection choice, even when a market 
is tipping towards a different dominant standard (Suarez, 2005).  This work suggests that markets may 
not tip in favor of only one alternative.  Adopters may choose the technology that prevails in their strong-
ties network.   
This research extends the literature by addressing how a firm’s network of ties affects its ability to 
influence adoption.  That tie strength matters is an important underlying principle of an information 
sharing strategy.  This research does not address how aspects of timing of delivery and message content 
affect standards contests.       
A variety of other actions have been suggested as useful for winning standard contests, including 
forward pricing, co-opting key resources such as lead customers, and continual product improvement 
(Shapiro & Varian, 1999).  Their common goal is to influence adopters’ technology choice.  Moreover, 
except for product development, these actions seek to influence adopters’ expectations and subjective 
evaluations of a technology before its potential has been fully realized.  This is critical for managing the 
chicken and egg problem: the need of technology sponsors to build an installed base in order to 
encourage other firms to develop complementary products for their platform, but at the same time foster 
the development of complementary products in order to build their installed base (Grindley, 1990). 
Timing has been recognized as an important aspect of standard setting, and timing of message 
delivery in a standards contest can be intensified by the presence of network externalities.  Managing the 
expectations of key adopters is an important tool that technology sponsors can use to influence the 
outcome of a standards contest.  In many cases, this process of managing expectations occurs long 
before the standard is market ready, forcing technology sponsors to share information regarding the 
anticipated benefits of the technology.  Selecting adopters that are predisposed to certain technical 
abilities of a standard is an important aspect of obtaining early support.          
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2.4 LINKAGE BETWEEN TIMING AND STANDARD DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
Throughout the literature on standards contests, the issue of timing surfaces as an important element of 
an information sharing strategy.  The literature identifies the forces that drive adoption and diffusion, 
while conveying how the aspects of the message, the choice of media, and the level of diversity 
associated with the target of influence impact key adopters’ choices.  Even though the literature covered 
thus far has offered some interesting revelations regarding certain aspects of an information sharing 
strategy, it doesn’t address whether firms use distinctive strategies to share information or when they 
might do so.  To gain further insight into these questions, I have selected a model from the literature on 
standard setting and technology diffusion that identifies the stages of diffusion and technology 
development (Bekkers, 2001).  This model is ideally suited to this task because it was initially developed 
to identify the life cycle associated with development of a wireless technical standard.  It was also based 
on the diffusion of innovations defined in Rogers (1995).  The differences in technical capabilities of a 
standard and those associated with adopters’ needs across three stages offers some insight into how 
information can be used most effectively within each stage and provides some structure to the timing 
associated with when firms should engage in different aspects of an information sharing strategy.  The 
literature on competitive response timing also offers some insight into this aspect of timing.     
Building on the work of Rogers (1995), Bekkers (2001) defines a three-stage standard development 
process that links the information content that firms should share, with how it should be timed.  Bekkers’ 
model consists of three phases: the development phase, where technology and other means are 
developed through the work of different actors focusing on the technical, economic, and strategic 
requirements; the adoption phase, where initial actors embrace the standard, IPR issues arise, and any 
formalized approval process occurs; and the diffusion phase, where the standard is selected by a wider 
group of actors and infrastructure is deployed.  (See Figure 1.)  This model displays how the information 
that the technology sponsor must convey, changes over time and how this information can drive adoption 
decisions.    
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In a standards setting contest or process, the critical window for influencing adopters, especially 
key adopters, immediately follows initial technical design and extends into the adoption phase.  The 
standards advocate should consider the unique needs of all relevant users in determining whom to 
contact, when to initiate this action, and what type of information to reveal.  Since many technical, 
economic, and strategic design issues remain undecided, the use of strong or direct ties will manage the 
complexity of the message content.  Standard sponsors will exploit their relationships to convey the 
anticipated benefits of the standard to early or key adopters.  These key adopters will be selected on the 
basis of their needs’ closely aligning with those of the technology sponsor and on the strength of the 
relationship.  Contact will be made via boundary spanners that function in technical or industry 
committees, through direct and in-direct alliances, or on the basis of past relationships. 
 
 
Source:  Bekkers, Rudi, “Mobile Telecommunications Standards – GSM, UMTS, TETRA, and ERMES”,  
Figure 1. The stages of standard development 
Development 
Adoption 
Diffusion 
•Early technical research 
•Technical, economic and strategic design issues
•Decision process for basic technical properties 
•Initial support from key adopters  
•Supporting measures from community at large  
•Infrastructure development and procurement 
•Equipment development and type approval issues 
•Intellectual property rights issues •Infrastructure deployed 
•Supply market structure 
•Standard upgrading 
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As the adoption phase winds down, the first round of significant actors will have selected a 
standard and their decisions are affecting the second round of actors or adopters.  As the technical 
properties of the standard become well defined, the sponsor’s message simplifies to conveying the 
standard’s capabilities and the support it has already gathered from key adopters.  Finally, as the 
diffusion phase begins, all relevant actors have chosen a standard and are in the process of deployment.  
Here the actors publicly justify their standard.  This activity has two purposes: to help the standard 
become established and to begin posturing for the standards contest that’s anticipated for the next 
generation technology. 
Technology sponsors share information to encourage adopters to select their technology over 
competing options.  Timing this stimulus is critical; the sooner a response is garnered, the more rapidly 
the bandwagon effect can be initiated, but premature support may misdirect the eventual outcome of the 
standards contest.  Speed of response can be a function of the characteristics of the technology sponsor; 
the information sharing action it applies; the channel selected for delivery; the degree of noise or 
uncertainty in the environment; and the ability of the responder to sense that an action has occurred, 
evaluate the message delivered, and decide upon a response (Smith & Grimm, 1991).  Among direct 
competitors, a firm that initiates an action is seeking to delay a competitive response for as long as 
possible.  In a standard setting process, the technology sponsor seeks to balance the speed of response 
to optimally capture the most support.   
A firm’s prior reputation is linked to its credibility in an industry.  A strong reputation leads to a 
higher degree of visibility in the marketplace and provides key adopters with more information about the 
actions of technology sponsors.  A firm with a strong reputation will need to invest less time in sharing 
information regarding its abilities because it will have a greater degree of credibility among adopters.  
Radical technologies require more information gathering by adopters because their costs and benefits 
may not be analogous to those of known technologies.  Technology sponsors should be concerned with 
the degree of visibility their technology has in the market.  The more visible the aspects of the 
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technology, the less information adopters require in their selection process.  Therefore a technology 
sponsor that can publicize the benefits of its technology can rapidly influence adopters.  
Adopters will be inclined to display their commitment to a technology through public 
announcements of their support.  These displays of approval for one technology over another are 
valuable in influencing other adopters, but public announcements of deployment of infrastructure carry 
more weight because they involve financial commitment.  Speed of response is also predicated on the 
type of channel or medium a firm selects.  Generally, mass media can solicit a faster response, since they 
are able to pass large amounts of information quickly to a wide variety of interested parties.  However, 
this may not be the case when a radical technology is involved, due to the ambiguity of the information 
that needs to be transferred.  Since noise and uncertainty can affect an adopter’s ability to process 
information and thus impact the speed of adoption, technology sponsors may choose to add noise and 
uncertainty depending upon how radical their technology is in comparison to competitors’.  Overall, the 
literature on competitive response supports the premise that firms use information sharing strategies to 
manage the speed of competitive response.  It seems logical to extend this premise to conclude that 
information sharing strategies would benefit technology sponsors in standards contests and that firms 
can therefore be expected to exploit the various aspects of information sharing that will influence key 
adopters in a timely fashion.                                       
I propose that the optimal strategy for sharing information is dependant upon the stage of the 
standard’s development, the type of relationships or ties that a firm has access to, the complexity of the 
information that needs to be communicated, and the end user characteristics.  To assure long-term 
success in a market, information sharing strategies also need to accelerate user adoption without ceding 
too much control over a firm’s technology to competitors.  In addition, a firm’s information sharing 
strategy should consider the effect of its reputation and the nature of its technology.  The stronger the 
reputation of a technology sponsor, the less information it must share regarding its abilities.  The more 
radical its technology, the more information it will need to share via personal relationships, if it desires 
rapid adoption.  Injecting noise and confusion into the environment may serve to slow down the adoption 
process of a radical technology and thus might become part of a strategy for a firm that is representing 
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an evolutionary technology.  I examine several considerations behind the selection and sequencing of 
elements within an information sharing strategy. These include the following: the entities that ultimately 
determine technology selection, those entities’ criteria, and the most effective method to deliver 
information to them.   
 
 
 
2.5 THE PROCESSES THROUGH WHICH STANDARDS ARE ESTABLISHED PLAY A ROLE IN DETERMINING 
MESSAGE CHARACTERISTICS AND MEDIA CHOICE 
 
Three distinctive forces drive adoption or diffusion and hence the standard selection process:  (1) 
authority – government bodies or cooperative industry committees that impose their choice on the 
market, (2) market or rational choice – selection of technology as an outcome of the cumulative choices 
of individual adopters, and (3) social mechanisms – choice of technologies can only be partially described 
as rational; the costs and benefits are complex, uncertain, and evolving; and the criteria by which 
technical characteristics ought to be evaluated are based on social mechanisms.  These forces are not 
isolated from each other, and multiple forces can combine to drive adoption in a standards contest.  
Therefore the process of standard selection is influenced by many actors within an industry, and the 
outcomes of many standards contests are not determined by technical merits alone.  Delivering 
information with the intent to influence these different actors can require different message content and 
communication channels or media.  A firm’s information-sharing strategy should consider the influence of 
authority, rational choice, and social influences on the process of adoption. 
  
2.5.1 The Committee Process 
 
Institutions such as professional societies, trade associations, and standards bodies provide an essential 
coordination function for technological innovation (Farrell & Saloner, 1986; Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1992).  
They provide venues to share technical information, adjudicate technical differences, and select 
standards (Rosenkopf & George, 2001).  Firms that participate in these forums benefit by gaining access 
to and control of technical and strategic information.  At the same time, they risk losing proprietary 
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information to competitors.  It is notoriously difficult to obtain agreement in these industry associations 
and standards bodies due to the presence of multiple competing interest groups (Grindley, 1990).    
Das and Van de Ven (2000) characterize this type of standard setting process as institutional and 
outline a strategy regarding how firms function under these conditions.  This strategy recognizes the 
presence and influence of firms, consumers, distributors, and regulators.  It suggests that selection is 
based on how technologies perform under both technical and non-technical criteria, and that the criteria 
for evaluating alternative technologies may not initially exist but are constructed through the interaction 
of the participants.  This type of selection process increases the complexity of information sharing, due to 
the inclusion of varied interest groups.  When diverse interest groups or institutional actors have an 
important influence on technology selection, these entities are more likely to be persuaded by direct and 
tailored communications, as their evaluation demands they weigh the requirements of multiple 
stakeholders, which makes it harder to rely on ”objective” assessments of technical performance.  These 
actors may expect greater accommodation from technology sponsors as the technology evolves, and 
such promises can only be made through relationships.  When the selection criteria widen beyond 
technical considerations to include political influences, the benefit of personal contact increases and the 
effectiveness of simultaneous contact is diminished.  This is analogous to the concept that a firm able to 
pursue strategies to influence this institutional process in favor of its own technology can increase its own 
innovative performance.  Spencer (2003) suggests that when a firm shares technological information 
about an innovation with external contacts, it can shape the technological and evaluation standards and 
direct the industry-wide discussion concerning the advancement of their technology.  It can also attract 
other innovators to its technological trajectory and thus form a critical mass of firms with a vested 
interest in the success of their technology. 
When the standard setting process is authoritative, it is characterized by the sharing of both 
technical and strategic information between key actors.  The presence of multiple interest groups 
complicates the content and the delivery of this information.  An information sharing method that enables 
personal contact is preferred in this environment, since in many cases the message delivered to the 
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target of influence is unique.  An information sharing strategy must take into consideration how the 
target of influence shapes the content of the message.  
     
2.5.2 The Market Process 
 
Often a particular standard becomes de facto for a particular market or industry, when individual firms or 
coalitions of firms successfully preempt competing technologies.  These alternative technologies compete 
until one standard gains sufficient market support to tip the market in its favor and create the 
bandwagon effect that leads to its dominance (Tassey, 2000).  Recent standards contests that unfolded 
in this manner include video recording formats, audio taping, audio compact discs, video discs, computer 
operating systems, spreadsheets, word processors, and telecommunication protocols (Liebowitz & 
Margolis, 1995).  A complicated and serious issue associated with market-based standard selection is 
convincing users to adopt the standard before it is proven.  In the critical early stages, decisions are 
based on expectation of who will win.  It is important for technology sponsors to influence these 
expectations and establish the credibility of the standard.  Various elements affect the attainment of 
credibility: technical capability, manufacturing capacity, financial backing, availability of complements, 
and ownership of essential IPR (Grindley, 1990; Bekkers, Duysters, & Verspagen, 2002).  Technology 
sponsors must time the delivery of information associated with these elements and ensure a fit between 
message content and media choice.   
An excess of information is available to firms in today’s marketplace.  Firms filter the content of the 
information for knowledge regarding the technical and marketing aspects of the standard that apply to 
their particular requirements.  Innovation-decision process theory (Rogers, 1995) suggests a set of 
criteria important to the successful diffusion of a new innovation.  The theory is based on time and five 
distinct stages.  The first stage is knowledge.  Potential adopters must first learn about the innovation 
and be persuaded as to its merits (Rogers, 1995).  This stage entails seeking one or more of three types 
of knowledge about the innovation: awareness knowledge – that an innovation exists, how-to knowledge 
– how to use an innovation properly, and principles knowledge – the fundamentals of how the innovation 
 7/25/2006   21
works.  Each type of knowledge should be delivered via a form of media that is ideally suited to the 
characteristics of the message.  
The knowledge stage of the process is where the different characteristics of the message impact 
the rate of adoption.  The message describes the context or intent being communicated.  The degree of 
observability and complexity associated with the message determine not only which media is the most 
effective at communicating the intended message, but the pace of communication.  Awareness 
knowledge can be fairly straightforward to communicate, as long as the awareness is directed at a large 
community of potential users.  The difficulty in communicating awareness knowledge increases as the 
target becomes narrower.  This alters the choice of media or communication channel.    How-to 
knowledge and principles knowledge generally increase the degree of message complexity and alter the 
choice of media for message delivery.  These are important considerations for technology sponsors in the 
design of their information sharing strategies.     
The next two stages of the innovation-decision process are persuasion and decision to adopt.  
Potential adopters, after becoming aware of the technical standard, must be persuaded of its merits and 
influenced to select it over competing standards.  This persuasion consists of information that references 
the aspects of the standards that make it credible.  Such information can be applied through direct face-
to-face contact or through a variety of indirect influences.  These may include advertisements, industry 
speeches, committee relationships, and market and technical trial results.  Technology sponsors must 
develop the right mix of compelling messages and apply effective communication channels to achieve 
their goal of influencing key adopters.  The final two stages, implementation and confirmation of decision 
choice, are outside the boundaries of this study.    
In a market-based process, information reaches potential adopters either directly from technology 
sponsors or through intermediaries.  The information itself or the content of the message has different 
characteristics depending upon the technology’s stage of development; its content ranges from highly 
complex technical information that can be difficult to share, to simplistic awareness knowledge.  Thus, an 
information sharing strategy for prompting markets to decide must consider how the message content is 
linked to the choice of media. 
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2.5.3 The Process Of Social Influence  
  
There has been a growing interest in exploring the influence that social mechanisms like alliances and 
relationships have on the outcome of a standards war (Dokko & Rosenkopf, 2004; Rosenkopf, Metiu, & 
George, 2001).  Alliances and cooperative agreements are used to share the cost of technical 
development and spread the risk associated with developing a standard.  The process of developing 
these cooperative agreements involves the sharing of information related to the technical standard, and 
the relationships that develop in conjunction with this information sharing can be very influential in 
convincing adopters to prefer one technology over another (Bekkers, Duysters, & Verspagen, 2002; Hill, 
1997).  These relationships can act as conduits for the purpose of information sharing, and developing a 
set of influential alliance partners can ensure the successful adoption of a standard.  When and how 
much to share are critical questions.  
This avenue of research has also reached the domain of social capital or social network theories.  
Dokko and Rosenkopf (2004) examined the role that technical standards setting committees have on the 
creation of social capital both at the firm and by the individual.  Their focus is on the connection between 
individual activity within these committees and firm-level outcomes in the standards setting process.  
They conclude that individual relationships are significant in influencing the process and that hiring 
connected individuals can increase the firm’s influence over standards setting.  But these explanations fail 
to address the timing of the leveraging of these relationships in relation to the stages of standard 
development or how message content in conjunction with choice of media impacts adoption. 
Characteristics of the message and the degree of uncertainty that adopters face also influence 
what media are best.  Media richness theory, derived from the communications literature, is based on the 
premise that commonly used media in organizations work better for certain tasks than for others (Daft & 
Lengel, 1986).  Specifically, written media is preferred for unequivocal messages while face-to-face 
contact is preferred for messages containing equivocality, where equivocality refers to the extent of 
ambiguity involved in the message.  Thus, rich media is generally defined as multi-channel, synchronous 
communication with wide language variety and high personal focus.  Lean media, which is normally 
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asynchronous and single channel, is best suited for the transfer of known facts or response to specific 
requests.  This classification relates to the literature on social networks, which premises the concept of tie 
strength on the amount of contact that occurs among a network of individuals and on the quality of the 
exchange.     
Since the type of relationships that a technology sponsor has access to can affect its ability to 
influence key adopters, a more detailed understanding is needed of how these relationships can be 
optimized within an information sharing strategy.  Bouty (2000) suggests that informal exchanges across 
organizational boundaries offer major learning opportunities and can influence innovation.  The strength 
of the relationship and the degree of direct competition between firms influences the propensity for an 
exchange of information to take place.  A stronger relationship can develop and exist between 
structurally equivalent actors. Therefore the position that firms occupy in their networks of relationships 
affects their ability to share information.  The information about a technology can be acquired by 
adopters directly from the technology sponsor through its promotional literature, from other adopters 
through a sharing of experiences, or indirectly through an intermediary.  A range of intermediaries such 
as suppliers, journalists, consultants, and trainers popularize the proposed purposes of the technology 
and thus influence users’ understanding of it (Orlikowski et al., 1995).  Firms engaging in an information 
sharing strategy must distinguish between direct competitors and those firms with which they are able to 
build a relationship that can support the delivery of their message.   
Social network analysis takes as its unit of analysis the exchange of resources between actors. 
Each kind of exchange is considered a social network relation, and individuals who maintain relations are 
said to maintain a tie.  A fundamental principle in social network theory is that a network is comprised of 
different densities and that ties can be classified as strong versus weak and direct versus indirect (Ahuja, 
2000).  Social network studies have identified several ways to distinguish a weaker tie from a stronger 
one.  Tie strength between pairs of actors can vary from weak to strong, for example, from acquaintance 
to friend to close friend or from co-worker to teammate.  Weakly tied pairs engage in fewer, less intimate 
exchanges and share fewer types of information and support than those who report stronger 
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relationships.  Strong ties involve a higher level of intimacy, more self-disclosure, emotional as well as 
instrumental exchanges, reciprocity in exchanges, and more frequent interaction.   
Each type of tie is characterized by different costs to sustain and is structured to transfer certain 
types of knowledge or information.  Rich qualitative content or information that requires interaction is 
best communicated through a direct contact or strong tie, whereas lean or simple context that does not 
require feedback can efficiently utilize a weak tie (Morabitio & Stohr, 2003; Hansen, 1999).  Strength of 
tie is typically measured through frequency of contact, although it may also be characterized by the 
degree of intimacy or emotional intensity (Granovetter, 1973).  Rich messages enable multiple cues and 
rapid feedback.  Strong ties allow for face-to-face contact and are thus the only way to discern visual 
cues.  They can be used to deliver complex information and are useful when issues are uncertain or 
ambiguous.  Weak ties, on the other hand, rarely rely upon face-to-face contact.  They are best used for 
the transfer of less ambiguous or routine information (Daft & Lengel, 1986). 
The social process associated with standard setting is premised on the various methods for the 
delivery of information through relationships.  The social relationships that form through a variety of 
different mechanisms offer a conduit for message delivery.  The literature on tie strength offers insights 
that assist in understanding how message content can be linked to a technology sponsor’s choice of 
media or channel.  An information sharing strategy that is sufficiently robust to effectively function across 
a variety of standard setting processes should recognize how message content is affected by the target 
of influence and the stage of technological development.  It must also consider how the message content 
is most effectively linked to the choice of media or channel for message delivery. 
Three primary factors drive adoption and diffusion in a standards contest: those derived through 
the authority of formal standard bodies and industry committees; the decisions of adopters rationally 
operating in a market based structure; and the social mechanisms associated with networks, 
relationships, and alliances.  The process of standard selection is influenced by many actors within the 
industry.  The requirements of each of these groups of actors differ in the manner and type of 
information necessary for its own evaluation of competing technologies.  When selection is based on how 
technologies perform on both technical and non-technical factors, this increases the complexity of 
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information sharing for technology sponsors and qualifies the content of the message to be delivered.  
Establishing the credibility of a standard is important when a technology sponsor must influence key 
adopters prior to the finalization of a technology.  Understanding the balance between timing of delivery 
and message content is a significant aspect of communicating this credibility to the market.  Alliances and 
networks form the basis of many relationships that exist among standard sponsors, manufacturers, and 
adopters.  These relationships can act as conduits for the delivery of information and contribute 
significantly to the process of standard setting.    
The choice of media used to deliver a message is of great import in an information sharing 
strategy.  Tie strength provides a backbone for linking message type to media choice.  Complex or 
potentially ambiguous messages are best delivered via direct or strong ties.  Simple, direct messages are 
usually best delivered via indirect or weak ties, to optimize a firm’s resources.  Technology sponsors must 
weigh the benefits of various channels against message content because selecting a channel that hinders 
adopters’ abilities to acquire timely information about a technology could impact their adoption choice.  
Selecting the ideal combination of message and media and instigating the information sharing process in 
a timely manner is an important strategic undertaking for the firm.    
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3.0 BUILDING THE MODEL 
 
 
 
 
3.1 INFORMATION SHARING STRATEGIES: BROADCAST AND CASCADE 
 
 
In this paper, I will examine two specific information-sharing strategies firms can use: broadcast or 
cascade, and suggest how their efficacy varies with characteristics of the technology, the firm and the 
environment.  The concept of an information cascade is drawn from the economic literature and pertains 
to situations where decision makers with private and incomplete information make public decisions in 
sequence.  Hence, the first few decision makers reveal their information and subsequent decision makers 
follow their lead.  In this way the actions of a few influence the choices of many.  Firms using a cascade 
information sharing strategy focus on closed communications with a few central adopters and/or 
developers, in an effort to leverage their ties to the rest of the community.  Geroski (2000) describes an 
information cascade as involving communication directed at pioneer users in an attempt to ”legitimize the 
innovation.”  Once that occurs, an epidemic or information cascade drives subsequent adoption and the 
bandwagon effect. Geroski identifies three phases in a diffusion process characterized by information 
cascades: an initial choice between technologies, lock-in to one technology and a bandwagon induced by 
imitation.  He suggests that the lock-in to one technology over another is driven in part by information 
available in the selection process and network externalities.  But there are many reasons for a firm to 
choose one technology over another, and none of them are easy to isolate.  The technology chosen 
might suit adopters’ needs better or it might be less costly.  Information about the technology might have 
been diffused more effectively or the infrastructure to support it might be more effectively organized. The 
premise that I am interested in exploring regards how the effective diffusion of information affects 
adoption. I will explore the actions by technology sponsors that influence adopters’ initial choice of 
technology.   
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Information cascades rely heavily upon a firm’s relationships for the sharing of information. Here 
the firm is interested in transferring complex information directly between individuals via a strong tie 
when the message content is tacit or complex. It seeks to leverage its ties with the community at large, 
in the hope of swaying the critical few required to influence the process of choice. When the firm is able 
to directly supply information about the technology’s benefits and intended use to potential end users, it 
will have a greater degree of control over the message that is communicated and the process that is 
used.  Trade associations, technical committees and alliances are vehicles through which technology 
sponsors can reach central adopters or developers.   
A key characteristic of a broadcast strategy is that the firm relies upon intermediaries to convey its 
intended message, yielding control over the process by which users are influenced to adopt its 
technology.  Firms employing a broadcast strategy primarily seek to communicate a standard simple 
message to the entire community via a weak tie. Since identification of a tie requires an exchange of 
resources, the question arises of how a broadcast strategy that primarily consists of one-way information 
flows can be characterized by tie strength.  The answer involves the presence of intermediaries.  A weak 
tie exists between the technology sponsor and an array of media contacts. These contacts are loosely 
maintained between a firm’s public relations department, and industry reporters and business editors.  
Contact is predominately via telephone or e-mail and typically occurs infrequently.  Either the firm or the 
intermediary can instigate the process of information sharing.  In this instance, mass media is the tool 
that the technology sponsor uses to communicate a consistent message to both competitors and the 
market.  Here the firm releases information about the benefits of a particular technological standard in 
the hope of swaying competitors or the market away from competing technologies.   
Signaling is another method that the firm can utilize to shape expectations about the future of the 
technology.  The concept of signaling, like response timing, is derived from the literature on competitive 
response (Schilling, 2003; Heil & Robertson, 1991).  Even though the focus of signaling is on controlling 
competitive behavior, it may also apply to managing adopters’ expectations in a standards contest.  
When a signal is deliberate, it can benefit technology adopters by indicating their intentions regarding the 
development or refinement of a technology and by communicating a commitment to the lifelong support 
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of a technology. Thus sharing information of this nature supports its credibility and may influence 
adopters’ selection. Similarly, the presence of complementary products can act as a signal that a 
technology has the support required to avoid stranded investment.  The firm’s reputation in prior markets 
may also send a signal about its likelihood of success in a standards contest.  Table 1 compares 
broadcast and cascade information sharing based on the literature.   
 
 
Table 1. Comparison between broadcast and cascade information sharing 
 
Attribute 
 
Broadcast 
 
Cascade 
 
Message 
 
Simple and standard 
 
Complex and unique 
 
Medium 
 
Mass media via weak tie 
 
Leveraged relationships via strong ties 
 
Target 
 
Entire community 
 
Individuals, small groups, single firms 
 
Timing 
 
Adoption and diffusion phases 
 
Development and adoption phases 
 
 
 
 
3.2 A MODEL FOR INFORMATION SHARING IN A TECHNICAL STANDARDS SETTING PROCESS 
 
 
The model in Figure 2 integrates the relevant bodies of literature into a succinct and usable framework 
for determining when firms are apt to select either a broadcast or cascade information sharing action as 
part of their overall strategy in a standards contest.  Both timing and message content are critical 
determinants of the type of information sharing that a firm selects.  The phase of a standards 
development is the primary determinant of message type and thus complexity.  In turn, message 
complexity and message content are inherently linked and influence whether cascade or broadcast is 
employed.  A standards contest characterized by network effects is consistently based on influencing key 
adopters.  These adopters differ regarding the criteria they apply for standard selection, with the 
presence of multiple user groups typically increasing the unique nature of the message to be delivered 
while users with homogenous needs can be offered a simple and clear message. 
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Note:  The difference in thickness of lines connecting the phases to the content boxes depicts the amount of this type of 
information sharing.  The characteristics of a given adopter impact the type of information that a technology sponsor delivers.  The 
decisions of key adopters affect the content of ongoing information to be shared and the choice of media for sharing throughout the 
entire standards contest.   
Figure 2. Model of information sharing in a standards contest 
 
 
 
Cascade information sharing is characterized by the delivery of complex and interactive message 
content and generally involves the delivery of how-to knowledge and principles knowledge.  The message 
consists of rich qualitative information and relies upon the use of verbal and non-verbal cues.  Since 
personal contact is necessary but costly and time restrictive, the process of cascading information 
maintains the personal contact required for a select group of early adopters but also allows for the 
message to be delivered to multiple users later on in the process.  This type of information sharing 
should be seen to transpire over a strong or direct tie, which is also more effective for sharing 
information about radical technologies and when adopter’s choices are irreversible.   
Broadcast, unlike cascade, functions more like cable delivery onto a television set, with delivery of 
content occurring on a one-way channel or via intermediaries.  The message is less complex and requires 
little if any immediate interaction.  Awareness knowledge is an example of a message that potentially fits 
Rich content
Lean content
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Strong tie 
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this criterion, where a simple and straightforward message can be used to notify a community of users 
that a new technical standard is available.  Large investments in a developing technology or network 
infrastructure signal commitment to the marketplace and reduce the risk that a different technology 
might attain dominance.  A strong reputation can also assist in influencing adopters’ expectations 
regarding a technology sponsor’s ability to bring a developing technology to market readiness.  Broadcast 
information sharing is expected to primarily occur through an indirect or weak tie.   
When it is beneficial to communicate a simple, standard message that requires minimal interaction, 
it is advantageous to broadcast that message to the community at large, using a weak tie.  When the 
firm needs to communicate a complex message that’s tailored to the receiver, it can rely upon strong ties 
and a cascade information sharing strategy, which targets a small group of users who in turn influence 
others.  This mirrors Granovetter’s concept of crucial bridges that exist within a network.  These bridges 
exist between weak ties but are important in transferring information to and from distant parts of the 
social system.  In a standards contest, once a particular standard gains a few key adopters, this 
influences others within the network to also consider selecting this standard over another, resulting in the 
broad-based support that creates momentum for a technology (Wade 1995).   
The development phase requires the transfer of a high degree of complex or rich information. This 
is best managed over a strong or direct tie via a cascade information sharing strategy.  This trend 
continues into the adoption phase where we see a higher degree of rich, complex information being 
transferred between actors, but the amount of lean, simple information also increases.  Finally, as we 
enter the diffusion phase, almost all the information related to the standard selection process is simple or 
lean, and firms employ broadcast information sharing to communicate these messages. 
Proposition #1:  Technology sponsors engaged in a standards contest will rely more heavily on the use of 
cascade information sharing when the technical standard remains in its development phase.   
Proposition #2:  Technology sponsors engaged in a standards contest will rely more heavily on the use of 
broadcast information sharing when the technical standard has moved into the adoption phase.   
 
Since the presence of multiple interest groups in a standards contest increases the probability that 
key adopters will have unique requirements, the message to be delivered to this type of community will 
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typically be complex and ambiguous.  This increase in complexity will occur no matter the phase of 
standard setting and will therefore reinforce the amount of cascade information sharing evident within all 
three phases.   Therefore the characteristics of the target of influence also determine the more 
appropriate information sharing method.  Conversely, when user needs are homogenous and key 
adopters are primarily concerned with technical abilities of the standard, technology sponsors may use 
more broadcast information sharing.  Once again, this occurrence is not dependent upon the phase of 
standard selection but will influence all phases of the standard setting process.  
Both timing and message content are critical determinants of the type of information sharing that a 
firm selects.  Each stage within the standards setting process is characterized by its own unique 
information that technology sponsors share to influence adoption.  The point in time and the content of 
the information to be shared, along with the individual attributes of the target, determine whether the 
appropriate method of delivery is broadcast or cascade.  The selection and sequencing of multiple 
information sharing elements forms the basis of an information sharing strategy.
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4.0 METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
This analysis focuses on the standards contest for 2G digital wireless in the United States.  I selected this 
battle due to the following reasons: the dominant standard evolved through a competitive standard 
setting process, a sufficient amount of time has passed to allow for access to the complete standards 
process, and there exists sufficient media coverage of the entire process to ensure that multiple sources 
of data are available for analysis.  Since standards are a prominent aspect of wireless telecommunications 
and the presence of network externalities increases the significance of the technology selection, the 
degree of overall firm involvement in this process is high. 
I selected a case study methodology because understanding the impact of information-sharing 
events and activities on the outcome of a standards battle requires analyzing the entire process that a 
technological standard undergoes in order to gain market dominance.  Through examination of the 
standards development process from initial development to infrastructure deployment, I looked for 
sequences of actions and events that might indicate which strategies were most successful.i  The wireless 
industry is characterized by technical and market complexity.  Multiple players, fragmented technology, 
and diverse user needs all increase the number of contingencies that should be considered by a firm 
wishing to influence technical standards setting.  Therefore, the decisions and actions of firms are best 
understood and analyzed within a qualitative study that allows for in-depth analysis and an understanding 
of the events in a real-life context.  Due to this inherent complexity within the environment, I not only 
will look for evidence to assess the propositions derived from the literature but will seek other aspects of 
firm strategies for influencing standards contests that the literature does not currently address.  
Since the strategies associated with information sharing can only be inferred from sequences of 
actions and outcomes, qualitative research is ideally suited to this undertaking − it is concerned primarily 
with the underlying process, meaning, and understanding of a particular situation (Creswell, 1994).  It 
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allows for the interpretation required to uncover all of the relevant information.  A longitudinal case study 
is particularly suited to this type of research because its primary purpose is to analyze one research entity 
at multiple points in time or through a temporal sequence of events where the researcher is seeking to 
establish that a given effect is outside normal fluctuations within a time series (Jensen & Rodgers, 2001).  
This research studies and documents events that unfolded over a 10-year period.  I utilize a single-case 
design with the focus on events and actions of multiple firms within a single industry, focusing on the 
information-sharing actions between two primary technology sponsors and the body of potential 
adopters.  The unit of analysis is the firm, and my interest is directed at the actions firms undertook 
through their sharing of information to influence the outcome of a technical standards process.  
The time period of interest begins in the early 80s in the European community and extends until 
1997 in the United States.  This is when the majority of network operators had chosen a 2G standard, 
and manufacturers had determined their own level of support.  Although the case study focuses on the 
standard contest in the American market for 2G, it seems important to include certain aspects of the 
European standard setting process for 2G because the firms involved in digital wireless operate on a 
global scale and occurrences within the European situation impact events and actions taken in the United 
States. 
To identify the information sharing strategies, understand their patterns of change, and document 
the outcomes specifically enabled by information sharing, I needed an in-depth view of the actions and 
events along with the context in which they occurred.  Therefore this process began with an extensive 
web search to familiarize myself with the 2G standard setting process.  This enabled me to identify the 
group of key actors and relevant terminology that supported my data collection process.  This web search 
also provided the raw data to determine the time horizon for the study.  To guide data collection and 
assessment, I developed a series of research questions based on theory that identified the study's 
research objectives; identification of firms’ information sharing strategies and determining their impact on 
adoption.  These questions were used in the collection and categorization of the study data.  Yin (1989) 
refers to this as a ”case study protocol.”  
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4.1 DATA COLLECTION 
 
 
I collected data over two main time periods: May through November 2004 and July through September 
2005.  Using the key search terms I had already identified, I began the search for articles, books, and 
analyst reports that dealt with 2G wireless during the 16-year period I designated for the study: 1982 
through 1998.  Initially, I assessed the relevancy of an article based on its title.  This located 148 relevant 
articles, books, and analyst reports.  After reading through each article in its entirety, I reduced these to 
59 that reflected information specifically on the 2G standard setting process and relevant actions 
undertaken by any of the main actors.  Many of the articles I discarded, either dealt with highly technical 
standards issues or were irrelevant to the information-sharing actions of firms.  From these 59 sources, I 
extracted 80 quotes, comments, or statements that displayed evidence of information sharing between 
key actors.  These formed the basis of my initial data set. 
The data either were located from direct actions that can be identified and labeled as part of an 
information sharing strategy or emerged from a process or series of activities undertaken by a firm.  
These include press releases that espouse a standard’s benefits or identify commitment from a service 
operator or manufacturer, evidence of active participation in a standards setting committee or meetings 
where the discussion involved a technical standard, signs of visible commitment to a particular standard 
as in alliance or joint development agreements, speeches or public statements that display benefits or 
advantages of a standard, and documentation of live demonstrations along with market and technical 
trials.  All data was gathered through a purposive sampling method, with the population consisting of all 
network operators and equipment manufacturers involved in the 2G wireless standard selection contest in 
the U.S.  Sample members must be seen to actively participate in a manner that has been documented in 
a secondary source. 
The data was gathered from multiple sources.  These included inter-organizational agreements, 
product/technology announcements, analyst assessments, expert testimony, and management 
comments.  I used secondary data sources that were publicly available, mirroring the method employed 
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by Das and Van De Ven (2000).  By relying upon data that was recorded at the time the events occurred, 
the retrospective bias that might occur through the interview process with informants was minimized.  
Also, these sources provided information identifying the actions that companies actually undertook.  As 
did Das and Van De Ven (2000), I attempted to only include information about a firm’s actions that could 
be gathered from at least two separate sources, in order to avoid potential editorial bias.  Thus a second 
data search was undertaken to determine if this type of support could be located for all actions and 
events in my initial data set.  This process was almost completely successful, resulting in multiple 
evidence of support for the majority of the actions and events.  Only 9 items were unable to be 
supported by a minimum of two separate sources.  In addition, seven more information-sharing actions 
were identified.  Being adequately sourced, they were added into the data set.  Upon further analysis, I 
determined that the five items from a single source were consistent with the others in their description of 
actions and events.  Therefore I judged that their inclusion would not bias the data set, and the final 
conclusion from this study is based on relevant data supported by both single and multiple sources.ii  
Therefore the final size of the data set is 87 relevant items.  
 
4.2 DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Since I relied upon publicly available data, my sources, books, newspaper articles, and public company 
documents are all available for perusal. Each quote or example gathered was initially categorized as 
either a cascade or a broadcast information-sharing event.  Based on theory that distinguishes these two 
types, I developed a set of criteria to define each.  The first step after locating an information-sharing 
event or action involved identifying the content of the message to be delivered and the type of media 
used for delivery.  Messages comprised of strategic and technical content or involving operational or 
design specifications were determined to be complex; those that contained support for a standard, 
claimed benefits or disadvantages, or announced operational readiness were classified as simple.  
Complex messages were typically delivered via interpersonal channels that allowed for frequent and 
direct contact.  Simple messages were delivered through press releases, interviews, and speeches. This 
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classification was based on theories of media and information richness in Daft and Lengel (1984; 1986), 
is related to descriptions of the message content and media choice for rich and lean information, and 
reinforces the literature on tie strength that supports the relationship between the strength of 
interpersonal ties, message content, and choice of channel for delivery (Granovetter, 1973; Hansen, 
1999).  I reviewed all 87 data items and coded each as either cascade or broadcast.  Next, they were 
listed chronologically.  The data were then separated further according to those information-sharing 
instances or actions initiated by Ericsson or Qualcomm, the key standards advocates.  Finally, the target 
of influence was identified as being government, key adopters, and industry in general, or the market.  
The results of this data gathering are depicted in the Results section.   
The strength of my methodology is its ability to view patterns within the data as they relate to 
actions and outcomes over an entire process.  Its weakness is lack of generalizability to other industries.  
As with many forms of research, this study entails a trade-off: it sacrifices some degree of external 
validity to gain a more precise understanding of how the strategic sharing of information can influence 
standard setting.  In response to this criticism, Yin (1984) argued that cases are not statistical "samples" 
and that the goal in case study research is to understand behavioral logic ("analytical generalization"), 
not to enumerate frequencies ("statistical generalization").  When studying human decisions and actions, 
”soft” predictions are appropriate to accommodate the unexpected influences that impact these types of 
choices.   
The important aspect of this study is that it is seeking to provide insights into the factors that 
define firm choices in a particular situation.  The descriptive results of this study will form a unique 
interpretation of events related to whether and when firms use information-sharing strategies in 
standards contests.  The results, while not directly transferable to standards contests in other industries, 
will provide a greater understanding of the information sharing strategies of firms engaged in standards 
contests where network externalities are present, competition exists between both evolutionary and 
revolutionary technologies, and the phases of the standard setting process are sufficiently similar to that 
of 2G to allow congruence within the information content that is to be delivered.  Thus, the value of the 
 7/25/2006   37
case study findings in this study lie not in their complete generality, but in the behavioral insights they 
suggest. 
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5.0 BACKGROUND: THE WIRELESS INDUSTRY 
 
 
 
 
The wireless industry consists of all companies that are connected to providing wireless voice and data 
services in the United States.  Service providers are defined as those firms that build and/or maintain the 
wireless infrastructure and offer telecommunications services to users of wireless devices. Manufacturers 
provide the components of the infrastructure along with the end user devices.  Technology sponsors 
consist of a subset of equipment manufacturers that also develop technical standards.  Adopters consist 
of service providers and other manufacturers that must decide which technology to support. The wireless 
industry is characterized by intense competition, high entry barriers, technological fragmentation, strong 
growth, and market fragmentation.  These characteristics influenced the decisions and actions of firms 
participating in the standards contest for 2G.  These key characteristics are also salient features of the 
wireless industry as they relate to the events associated with the 2G standard contest.  I also wish to 
assess the degree to which they affect the information sharing strategies of the key actors; technology 
sponsors (Qualcomm and Ericsson) and technology adopters (service providers) and thus act as 
important boundary conditions for my study. 
 
 
 
5.1 DEGREE OF RIVALRY 
 
 
There is a high degree of rivalry amongst service providers in the wireless industry.  Competition is fierce 
and continues to increase as the industry matures.  Basic wireless service has become a commodity, with 
its offerings differentiated solely by coverage area and price.  Consumer plans that offer unlimited usage 
under a variety of conditions have contributed to rapid growth in volumes of minutes and decreased 
profit margins for service providers.  New production introductions are rapidly imitated, and consumers 
hardly have to wait for their own service providers to introduce competitive offerings. This rivalry among 
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service providers assisted in defining the important criteria that these adopters would apply to their 
selection of a 2G technology. It elevated the importance of selecting a technology that would optimize 
network capacity.  A viable message that assured service providers that this important requirement would 
be met was a substantial component of an information sharing strategy.  
 
 
 
5.2 BARRIERS TO ENTRY 
 
 
The wireless industry possesses high entry barriers due to the requirement for access to government 
controlled spectrum and the necessity for large capital outlays to both acquire spectrum and build 
wireless infrastructure.  These entry barriers are in place for all new market entrants interested in 
providing digital service. The auction process instituted by the FCC in late 1994 for the assignment of 2G 
spectrum was structured to enhance competition.  Its goal was to temporarily ease entry into an industry 
previously closed to new competition.  In order to ensure that only bidders with adequate financial 
backing participated, the FCC forced applicants to pay an up-front fee for any area in which they 
intended to bid.  For some of the larger areas like New York City, this fee could be as high as $16M.iii   
The continental USA was divided into 46 MTAs (Major Trading Areas), with licenses available in 
each MTA.  Current operators were restricted from bidding on spectrum in their own markets, and no 
single operator would be able to acquire national coverage. These and other rules effected fragmentation 
of the industry by ensuring that multiple players obtained licenses to small portions of spectrum spread 
throughout the U.S. The main round of auctions was slated for December 1994, and the FCC received 74 
bid applications for 99 wireless licenses.  Relatively few technical standards or service requirements were 
imposed on the licenses, causing PCS system operators or new license holders to have relatively little 
concern for interoperability with each other’s systems.iv  However, there were restrictions on the 
timeframes for service deployment.  PCS service providers who purchased licenses in the auctions were 
required to begin offering service within two years or face possible forfeit of their licenses.v They were 
also required to pay half of their spectrum license fee within the first week after receiving the license and 
the remaining half within one year.vi  For national operators who purchased large blocks of spectrum, this 
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required being ready to pay the FCC extremely large sums of capital quickly.  In total, these auctions 
raised over $7 billion for the FCC. 
One of the primary outcomes of the FCC’s announcement of a 2G auction process was its impact 
on the timing of information sharing strategies. The auctions acted as a trigger for service providers to 
make their technology selection.  The capacity issues of the late 1980s were being resolved through 
advancements in analog infrastructure.  The introduction of micro cells and cell enhancers in the early 
1990s had mitigated any capacity issues that service providers were facing in dense urban cores and 
therefore reduced the pressure for 2G standard selection.vii   This innovation allowed service providers to 
delay making a technology choice and provided additional time for new technologies to achieve market 
readiness.  However, the advent of the auctions forced many current and hopeful service operators to 
increase their interest in technology selection, since bidding in the auction required predicting full-scale 
deployment costs, which necessitated selection of a technology.  
Wireless service is characterized by high fixed costs and is therefore a volume-based business with 
greater profits accrued through the transport of greater volumes of traffic.  Wireless service providers 
must continually invest aggressively in their networks in order to support growth in usage and the arrival 
of new services.  Thus, aspects of scale and scope influence decision making within the industry.   
The primary objective of a wireless digital carrier is to provide a nationwide network of continuous 
service with ease of use for the end user.viii   To achieve that, service providers must either leverage 
existing frameworks or build new network infrastructures that can support coast-to-coast wireless service.  
Furthermore, the wireless network operator must build or acquire the operating and support 
infrastructure for functions such as billing and customer care.  Implementation of an integral, fully 
functioning system required both industry experience and access to finances.  
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Figure 3. U.S. network operators – merger, acquisition, and joint venture activity: 1990-2000 
 
 
Although there were many potential wireless carriers immediately following the FCC auctions, only 
a few possessed the capabilities to accomplish development of the necessary infrastructure in a timely 
fashion.  Through alliances, acquisitions and roaming agreements, wireless providers gathered the 
necessary resources and capabilities to offer seamless national or even global service.  Therefore, the 
market realities of the wireless industry overcame the imposed fragmentation, and the industry became 
consolidated once again.  The considerable post-auction M&A activity was undertaken with the 
recognition of incompatibility among the competing standards, and the alliances that formed among 
network operators took this into consideration.ix  Throughout 1995–2000, merger and acquisition activity 
resulted in the top carriers’ being reduced to Verizon Wireless (formerly GTE and PCS PrimeCo members), 
Cingular Wireless (SBC and Bell South), AT&T Wireless, Sprint PCS (divested themselves of both Cox and 
Comcast), Voicestream (subsidiary of Western Wireless and now T-Mobile) and Nextel (see Figure 3).x   
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5.3 TECHNOLOGICAL FRAGMENTATION 
 
 
Fragmentation of the technology is indicated by the number of distinctive components that comprise the 
technology and the number of different firms that should be considered sponsors of a particular standard.  
Both manufacturers and service providers need to address this heterogeneity in the market.  The greater 
the number of distinctive components that comprise the technology, the greater the number of different 
firms involved in the process of product development and distribution. 
Technological fragmentation affects how information travels through communities of end users and 
technology developers, and the degree to which each developer or adopter affects another’s decision to 
choose a technology.  In choosing an information sharing strategy, a firm considers what diffusion 
pattern is most likely for a particular type of community.  In place of a few known actors, industries 
characterized by technological fragmentation have multiple actors – some known and others unknown.  
Multiple signals exist and there is noise in the environment, which can delay key actors’ responses.  It 
becomes more difficult to influence outcomes in complex environments, and firms might require more 
information prior to making decisions (Forster, 1986).   These events can increase the uncertainty 
associated with a standards setting process and result in firms’ seeking to reduce this uncertainty through 
alliances and information gathering activities.  
Digital wireless technology is a complex technical system that involves many different industry 
layers in order to function effectively.   The radio access portion (RAN) of the network is primarily 
comprised of the handsets, base transceiver station (BTS) and the base station controller (BSC).  The 
BTS is the transmit and receive link for a mobile communication system. It's the device that 
communicates with the mobile phone and come in three sizes: pico, micro and macro.  Each size offers 
different benefits according to whether the application is indoor or outdoor, the size of the region to be 
covered and the density of users.  The BSC, the final component of the RAN, manages the handoff 
between BTSs.  It consolidates the transmissions from multiple BTSs and sends the transmissions to the 
mobile switching center (MSC).  The MSC bridges the wireless network with other networks and acts as 
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the gateway or entrance points to these other networks.  Since users require the ability to access both 
other wireless users and wire line users and have a growing demand for global communications, 
interconnection of all wireless and wire line networks is necessary.  Thus, a digital wireless standard must 
include the detailed specification of several distinct interfaces.  
Developing and distributing all of these components cannot be managed by a single firm, or by a 
small group of firms.  In today’s market place, there are at least 100 firms involved in some aspect of the 
development, manufacture and service provisioning of a wireless network.  This is not surprising, since 
past research efforts have identified that complex technologies require the participation of multiple 
parties for continuous innovation (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992; Rycroft and Kash, 1994). One example 
of the complexity inherent within the wireless industry is the large number of firms that are involved in 
the manufacture of a wireless handset, which is just one component of a complete digital wireless system 
(see Figure 4).   
A typical cell phone handset, despite its basic function of sending and receiving a telephone call, is 
a complex piece of equipment.  It requires many different operating systems and interfaces to provide 
the combinations and range of services demanded by the market.  Handsets’ user interfaces can vary in 
screen size, depth of color and keypad configuration.  Chip-level differences can constrain their memory 
and processing speed.  Many cell phones operate like miniature computers.  A myriad of manufacturers 
and service providers contribute to the development and manufacturing of a single cell phone.  Thus, the 
cellular telephone industry is characterized by a highly fragmented technology (see Figure 4).         
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Technical Complexity – The Pieces of the Puzzle in the Mobile Handset Industry 
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Figure 4. Manufacturers of mobile handset components 
 
 
 
Firm strategy for sharing information with other sponsors and adopters is affected by the degree of 
technological fragmentation.  Under a high degree of technology fragmentation, multiple players are 
typically involved in the development of the standard – the target of influence spans beyond traditional 
users.  Multiple players can lead to many different interests and priorities, increasing the difficulty of 
reaching agreement on the merits of a particular standard.  These users are critical to the development 
of the technology and must be brought on board.  To achieve this, the firm’s information sharing strategy 
must adapt to the unique needs of each party involved, requiring a customized cascade strategy.  
 
 
 
5.4 GROWTH 
 
 
Wireless has been one of the most dynamic and fastest growing industries of the past 20 years.  Between 
1983, the year of wireless service inception in the U.S. market, and 1999, wireless subscribers grew to 86 
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million, driven primarily by consumers.  A large portion of this growth is attributed to substantial declines 
in service prices; between 1996 and 1999, average prices per minute of usage declined by more than 
30%.  During the same period, wireless user demand was found to be price elastic, with average usage 
doubling from 200 to 400 minutes per month.xi  This growth made the industry an attractive proposition 
for service providers and makers of complementary products.   
Ongoing innovation in content, related wireless devices like personal digital assistants (PDAs) and 
advances in chips and semiconductors stretched the capacity of existing wireless networks.  The problem 
of insufficient capacity increased the pressure on service providers to select a technology standard.  At 
the same time that these new innovations were increasing the pressure on industry to move from 1G to 
2G, technological advancements in 1G technologies were reducing this pressure.  These advancements 
enhanced analog network abilities to partially manage the demands of increased usage and thus allowed 
service providers to retain their current infrastructure for an extended period of time. This allowed the 
revolutionary standard CDMA to work through a series of technical difficulties and eventually become as 
market ready as TDMA and GSM. 
 
 
 
5.5 MARKET FRAGMENTATION 
 
 
Fragmentation of the market refers to variation in adopters’ use of and preferences for the technology; 
the criteria that optimize the technology’s utility to some users may detract from its value to another 
segment of the market.  If adopters’ needs are homogenous and the product is not complex in its make-
up or application, a consistent, simple message regarding the intent of the technology and its anticipated 
benefits can be communicated to the entire market simultaneously, irrespective of the standard’s stage of 
development.  However, in a market characterized by a high degree of heterogeneity in adopters’ needs 
and complexity associated with the technology, a more detailed and differentiated message needs to be 
communicated across a variety of target markets.  In each situation, a different information sharing 
strategy and the timing associated with its use may yield greater success in influencing users’ 
preferences. 
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Demand for service in the wireless industry is fragmented, with consumer demand expectations 
that vary according to individual lifestyle.  Different market segments require differing levels of network 
coverage and different levels of usage.  Sophisticated users are interested in access to advanced 
features, while more casual users require only basic service.  The market is able to select from a variety 
of offerings or packages comprised of different allocations of wireless minutes.  In addition, the packages 
also contain an array of enhanced services. Individual users generally pay a flat monthly fee for these 
packages, but can customize their own service through selecting or opting out of certain features or 
offerings.  Advancements in chip technology allow users to customize their handsets with applications 
and features instead of being constrained by service providers or handset manufacturers.xii  Thus, 
wireless service is able to appeal to multiple segments within any market.  
Although this market fragmentation allows wireless services to have appeal in many different 
market segments, it does not increase the complexity of the information sharing message to be 
communicated to end users.  This message is comprised of coverage advantages and differences in 
allocations of monthly minutes and can be delivered adequately through broadcast channels.  
 
 
 
5.6 FUTURE RISK 
 
 
Rapid change, an uncertain future and technical fragmentation forced many firms to enter into alliance 
arrangements from 1990 through 1996, when the technologies were undergoing development.  The 
technology was complex, with many vested sponsors and significant risk embedded in decision making.  
Service providers that deployed the wrong technology might be stranded with infrastructure, whereas 
manufacturers that developed the wrong technology might face financial decline. Companies in both 
sectors needed to reduce their exposure, since no-one was able to predict which wireless standard would 
dominate the U.S. or global market.  This spurred development agreements between standards sponsors 
and key service providers and manufacturers.  These agreements generally involved the exchange of 
capital and specialized knowledge and required personal relationships for effective delivery, since some of 
the information associated with the standard’s development at this time is tacit.  These relationships also 
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formed the basis for the merger and acquisition activity that followed, with many of these alliance 
partners ending up equity partners. 
Nearing the end of the development period, firms began to prepare for commercial deployment of 
networks.  This caused a shift towards the use of licensing agreements, where those firms involved in the 
development of the standard, issued licenses that allowed others to manufacture infrastructure 
components and handsets.   Many wireless equipment manufacturers chose to acquire licenses for more 
than one standard, in case one standard would dominate.  These licensing agreements occurred in 
conjunction with the signs of early adoption and correspond with a shift from the use of relationships and 
cascade information sharing to increased broadcasting of the technical and market claims of all 
competing standards. 
 7/25/2006   48
 
 
 
6.0 CASE STUDY:  THE SECOND-GENERATION (2G) DIGITAL WIRELESS STANDARD SETTING PROCESS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
 
The 2G standards contest in the United States is an excellent example of a competitive standard setting 
process.  It is primarily a competition between two different firms, each sponsoring its unique technical 
standard. This provides the backdrop for an analysis of information sharing methods.  This case study 
looks at the development and deployment of the air interface standards TDMA, GSM and CDMA, focusing 
on the information sharing aspects evident within this standard setting contest.   
The first section overviews the technologies and provides the context for the discussion on the 
timing of information sharing events and actions.  The next sections describe in detail the technology 
sponsors and adopters, along with the decision criteria adopters use in the selection of a wireless 
technology.  Finally, the key information-sharing elements associated with the message, media, target 
and timing are described.  The actual information sharing events are provided in narrative form, 
beginning with the technology sponsor Ericsson and its support for both TDMA and GSM, and following 
with technology sponsor Qualcomm with its evident support for CDMA.  The final section of the case 
study provides insights into the outcome of the standards contest.  
 
 
 
6.1 THE TECHNOLOGY 
 
 
The first cellular services were analog and operated via a common standard at 800 MHz. These analog 
services are commonly referred to as First Generation Technologies (1G).   Second Generation wireless 
service (2G) is a digital offering that operates at and around 1850 MHz.  Digital technologies are 
considered superior to analog due to their ability to use spectrum more efficiently, allowing for greater 
transmission speeds and security.  Digital technology encodes voice into bit streams by sampling the 
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sound wave and then sending the frequency of each sample separately. This delivery method helps make 
digital transmission secure. Digital technology provides the faster data speeds necessary for today’s 
demanding multi-functional user. Digital technologies are a vast improvement over older analog systems 
like 800 AMPS, as the former allow increases in capacity and their transmission or voice quality is highly 
superior.xiii Other benefits of digital include better usage of "bandwidth," or being able to transmit more 
data within a fixed amount of time and reduced likelihood of a poor quality call.  One disadvantage of 
digital technologies is their requirement for smaller cell sites.  2G wireless services in the United States 
operate at a higher frequency (1.8 GHz to 2.2 GHz) than the AMPS or analog standard, which more 
severely limits the distance that the 2G wireless signal can travel.  This forces 2G operators to deploy 
more cell sites and purchase more equipment than analog carriers would.xiv The result intensifies the 
significance of the decision surrounding the choice of a digital standard, since it increases the presence of 
lock-in for the service provider.    
Another important difference in the digital case is the changing nature of the business environment 
for service providers.  Domestic concerns had been the primary driver in the choice of a standard, but 
with the advent of wireless digital, they’ve become overshadowed by global concerns.  A standard must 
allow access to this international network. According to the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), 
2G digital service requires network interconnection and universal access. National economies have 
become global economies, and international business has raised the demand for mobile services.  Cellular 
had largely been a business tool, but social demand for cellular has grown a vision of digital wireless 
service that is communications anytime, anywhere and to anyone.xv  The ability of service to be 
seamless, wherever the end user might be, will continue to increase in importance.  This change serves 
to heighten the importance of network externalities for this industry and has direct influence on the 
decision criteria for technology choice.   
There exist three separate methods for sending wireless information digitally. The first is frequency 
division multiple access (FDMA), in which each conversation is transmitted over a dedicated frequency.  
This is the earliest version of digital access and is considered the least efficient.   Next is time division 
multiple access (TDMA), in which a conversation is broken into packets or pieces of messages encoded 
 7/25/2006   50
with the destination address, which are then sent sequentially over a single selected frequency.  Finally, 
there is code division multiple access (CDMA), in which a conversation is broken into individual packets, 
each stamped with an identity code and sent out over a spread spectrum of frequencies.  These three 
technologies form of the basis of the digital wireless standards, with TDMA and CDMA being the ones 
directly involved in the 2G contest.   
There were three technologies vying to be the dominant standard in the U.S. wireless industry: 
TDMA (IS-54), the European version of GSM (TDMA 1900) and CDMA (IS-95).  The GSM technology was 
originally developed for the European market in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  TDMA, a derivative of 
GSM, did not begin development until the late 1980s but was still initiated slightly ahead of CDMA.  
European GSM also reached the adoption and diffusion stages later than either TDMA or CDMA.  The late 
entrance of GSM into the North American market was not from a lack of technical readiness, but due to 
the priority its technology sponsor had on the development and adoption of TDMA IS-54 in the United 
States wireless market (see Figure 5).  
In January 1989, the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA) endorsed the TDMA 
standard in the United States. The CTIA is an industry-based group consisting of both manufacturers and 
service providers who operate in the wireless industry.  Its endorsement, although not necessary for the 
marketing of a standard, was beneficial since a non-endorsed standard would have little chance of being 
adopted industry wide.  TDMA was an evolutionary technology and offered a seamless transition path 
from 1G to 2G.  Network operators would be able to reuse much of their current infrastructure under the 
guise of TDMA.  GSM and CDMA, on the other hand, required significant deployment of new 
infrastructure.  GSM was a proven technology, mandated as the standard of choice by the European 
community and already widely accepted internationally during the critical phases of the 2G standard 
contest in the U.S. market.  It was revolutionary in nature and required reconstruction of infrastructure, 
but promised benefits in increased capacity and feature availability.  CDMA was also a revolutionary 
change for wireless service operators and a bold departure from conventional wireless theory.  When 
QUALCOMM first proposed using the technology in 1989, much of the industry was mystified.  
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Qualcomm’s story is one of perseverance and unmitigated support for an innovative new technology that 
succeeds despite numerous obstacles and setbacks.    
 
 Source:  Bekkers, Rudi, “Mobile Telecommunications Standards – GSM, UMTS, TETRA, and ERMES” 
Figure 5. 2G wireless standards: the stages of standard development 
 
 
 
Initially, the standards contest was primarily between TDMA IS-54 and CDMA IS-95.  It gradually 
became evident that the IS-54 technology lacked the technical merits of CDMA or GSM.  IS-54 did 
undergo two revisions culminating in IS-136, which added features and corrected some basic problems, 
but its lack of market support hampered efforts to develop a migration path into the 3rd generation (3G) 
era.xvi  Therefore, although TDMA was initially thought to be a viable contender and was the first to be 
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endorsed by the CTIA, as time passed and its limitations became more obvious, the majority of U.S. 
service providers chose between the Qualcomm CDMA solution and the European based GSM solution 
supported by Ericsson.xvii 
Table 2. Key attributes of competing 2G standards 
 
Standard Technical 
Name 
Primary Advantages Technology 
Sponsor 
TDMA IS-54 ? Early CTIA endorsement 
? Backward compatibility with analog 
? Increased capacity over analog but only 
three-fold 
Ericsson 
GSM TDMA 1900 ? Proven technology with large international 
support 
? Increased capacity over analog, closer to 
six-fold 
Ericsson 
CDMA IS-95 ? Further increased capacity claimed over 
analog and other digital standards, at least 
ten-fold 
? Expectations of efficiency and cost 
effective future operations 
Qualcomm 
 
 
 
 
6.2 TECHNOLOGY SPONSORS: ERICSSON AND QUALCOMM 
 
 
Equipment manufacturers produce the base stations, control towers and handsets necessary for a 
wireless network.  They are actively involved in the development of the digital wireless technical 
standards and may decide at the outset to promote one standard over another.  Ericsson is credited with 
the basic design of GSM and TDMA and thus displays significant loyalty to both. It refused to develop any 
CDMA related equipment until the year 1999, when the technical strengths and limitations of the 
standard were well known.   
Qualcomm designed and developed the CDMA IS-95 standard, controlled numerous related patents 
and licensees and manufactured some of the technical components related to CDMA.  Due to the 
advanced nature of the CDMA standard, critical components like chipsets and software that facilitated the 
functioning of the first CDMA handsets were not available for Qualcomm to acquire from traditional 
equipment manufacturers. This forced Qualcomm to garner expertise in the development and 
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manufacture of ASIC (application-specific integrated circuit) technology in order to commercialize the 
CDMA technology, thus increasing their overall risk and commitment.   
Ericsson is a multinational telecommunications company based in Stockholm, Sweden, with more 
than 70,000 employees by the late 1980s.  The company was a pioneer in the development of wired 
telephones and had been in operation since 1876.  It was and remains the largest supplier of mobile 
systems in the world.  In contrast to Qualcomm, Ericsson was a large multinational telecommunications 
provider that possessed a strong reputation in the wireless industry for innovative products.  It was a 
traditional company and its hierarchical business unit structure reflected this.  Qualcomm was considered 
an upstart in the industry with a handful of wireless products all revolving around CDMA technology.  
When it developed the technology for CDMA in the early 1990s, it had fewer than 100 employees.     
Qualcomm, established in 1985 in San Diego, California, began as a six-person communication 
technology company providing contract research and development services and limited product 
manufacturing for the wireless telecommunications marketplace.  Qualcomm did have experience in the 
development and manufacturing of digital technologies, especially in the satellite industry.  However, it 
was markedly different from Ericsson in size, structure and culture.  There was a very fluid and open 
environment at Qualcomm that supported new ideas.  The original company members were all good 
friends, and business and pleasure often mixed.  This created an opportunistic approach to innovation 
where all ideas could be explored during or after hours.  Today it has revenues of over $4 billion, with 
8000 employees and operations in over 40 countries.xviii     
Ericsson has continually participated in the development of a variety of standards through its own 
research and development sector.xix  Qualcomm remains solely committed to CDMA and migration of this 
standard to 3G.   For Ericsson, advocating GSM and IS-54 was important but not critical to their existence 
as a firm.  Ericsson already possessed a strong industry reputation and numerous contacts.  It had access 
to large sums of capital that could be used to support the development and implementation of its 
standards.  Qualcomm, a relative newcomer within the industry, required the development of a network 
of contacts and the forging of new relationships with key actors.  Capital was often scarce, and it was 
necessary to form alliances to obtain critical funds.  With its focus on CDMA, Qualcomm had the most to 
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lose in the 2G contest since it was unlikely that it would exist as a firm if CDMA failed.  It accomplished its 
goal of CDMA industry-wide acceptance through persuasion and unwavering commitment.  
 
Table 3. Characteristics of the technology sponsors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
6.3 TECHNOLOGY ADOPTERS AND OTHER INFLUENCERS 
 
 
The key participants in the wireless industry consist of the network operators, which deploy the 
infrastructure and offer service to end users; equipment and switch manufacturers, which develop the 
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network infrastructures will survive and how their technology choice impacts features, price and 
performance in both the short and long term.xx  To avoid stranded investment, they desire a technology 
standard that other network providers and especially manufacturers are supporting.   
Traditionally, in an information-based standard-setting process, regulatory bodies are one of the 
most influential groups.  The nature of these standard setting processes and the impact they have on 
both public resources and economic prosperity have historically required the direct command and control 
of government supported boards operating in the best interests of the public.  Historically, regulators and 
government bodies are one of the most important early adopters that a firm supporting a particular 
technological standard must influence.xxi  This is certainly the case with GSM, as the active participation 
of many government bodies within the European communities was instrumental in its development and 
acceptance.     
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Actors and their main relations during the 2G standards contest 
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decided to let the marketplace determine the ”best” standard.  This is consistent with its behavior across 
a number of information-related technologies and is based on the belief that innovation patterns are 
better determined by responses to economic than to political forces, and that given the chance, firms will 
respond to commercial and technological opportunities and drive technological change.xxii  
End users cannot influence this process of standards adoption, but implicitly support a particular 
standard through their selection of wireless carriers.  They make this choice based on clarity of voice 
transmission, handset prices, usage rates, coverage and service.xxiii   Each digital standard has different 
capabilities associated with the technical aspects of spectrum usage and voice clarity.  The abilities of 
service providers also depend on the size of the network they deploy, the coverage they provide, the 
level of service they offer, and their pricing.    
 
6.3.1 The Service Providers 
 
 
The early wireless network operators in the U.S. market consisted of the Regional Bell operating 
companies of Bell South, Southwestern Bell (SBC), Pactel, Nynex, Ameritech, US West and Bell Atlantic; 
GTE; and McCaw Cellular.  By 1992, they represented the top 9 cellular providers and served a 
population base in excess of 350 million.xxiv  These were the incumbents that participated in the later 
selection of a digital wireless standard.  AT&T purchased McCaw Cellular in 1993, making AT&T Wireless 
the largest cellular provider in the U.S. market.  Since the cellular business was a success globally, 
predictions for future growth in both subscribers and usage made entry into this market very appealing.  
The FCC’s decision to implement an auction process for the dispersal of spectrum for 2G provided an 
entry opportunity to long distance carriers MCI and Sprint, and cable companies Comcast, TCI and Cox.xxv  
As of 1994, the top cellular providers or key adopters were Ameritech, AT&T Wireless, Bell South, 
GTE, PCS PrimeCo (partnership of AirTouch, Bell Atlantic, NYNEX and US WEST), Sprint 
Telecommunications Venture (alliance with Comcast and Cox Cable), Southwestern Bell (SBC) and 
Western Wireless.xxvi These were the key service providers whose technology choice was to determine 
the outcome of this standards contest.  By mid-1995, the majority of these carriers had made their 
selection regarding a 2G wireless standard.   
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6.3.2 How Service Providers Decide between Standards 
 
 
The choice of a wireless digital standard is driven by four primary concerns: capacity, feature availability, 
network deployment costs and market pricing of wireless devices. Long term capacity of the network is 
one of the most critical concerns for wireless service providers.  Wireless services require access to 
spectrum, a finite resource.  Technologies that make the most efficient use of available spectrum are 
considered superior. Digital technology has the ability to support larger volumes of users within a given 
network.  TDMA- or GSM-based standards are claimed to offer three- to six-fold increases in capacity 
over analog AMPS. CDMA is claimed to offer a ten-fold increase over AMPS.xxvii  Continually increasing 
demand for mobile services will constrain the ability of available spectrum to meet the future needs of 
users.  The key decision hinges upon degree of belief in each standard’s capacity claims.    
The availability for a wireless technology to support a variety of features is a measure of its 
functionality, that is, its capability to support technological advances.  One example of this requirement 
for the wireless phone industry is the ability to support the transmission of very high-speed data.  The 
wireless phone industry, although predominately interested in the transmission of digitized voice today, is 
quickly shifting towards future requirements for a wide variety of data applications.  The growing 
popularity of the Internet is placing increased emphasis on the development of wireless devices that 
combine voice communications and Internet access capabilities. "Cell phone and wireless PDA capabilities 
are moving well beyond just making a call or organizing personal information," according to Hans Geyer, 
Intel vice president and general manager of its PCA Components Group. "The ability to send and receive 
pictures, play rich 3D games, or download ring tones, video clips, and music are growing in popularity. To 
support the ongoing adoption of data services and applications, the underlying technology must be able 
to deliver enhanced multimedia capabilities and lower power."xxviii  Since ongoing innovation that displays 
commitment to a particular technological standard sends a signal of ongoing support, the future 
functionality of a standard along with a clear migration path to next generation technologies is effective 
at convincing potential adopters to select one standard over another.  
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Digital wireless standards are characterized by producer and consumer lock-in.  Producer lock-in 
has a strong impact on choice of standard.  Once service providers decide upon a standard, they must 
construct a network.  The large capital outlay and time commitment required to deploy a wireless 
network locks in operators and thus end users to certain standards. The rules that accompanied receiving 
spectrum in the 2G auction process forced service providers to commit and deploy in a short timeframe.   
To deploy a wireless network, a firm requires access to capital, technological expertise, potential cell sites 
and spectrum.  The cost of the equipment for these new technologies is highly dependent upon 
economies of scale in the manufacturing process.  A common standard can bring about network 
externalities that benefit producers.  They can acquire inputs more cheaply through exploitation of 
economies of scale associated with increased volumes of production.  Since each technological standard 
is significantly different, economies of scale can only be generated by sufficient demand for equipment 
meeting a given standard.   
Positive feedback and lock-in are also evident within the manufacturing of wireless handsets. 
Increased demand for a particular handset reduces the cost to produce it, thus reducing its market price.  
Handsets designed to function with one technology do not operate on another type of digital network, 
since each technology standard is unique.  The only means of compatibility exists through the original 
800 MHz band.  In order to offer national coverage during the initial years of digital service, wireless 
providers in the U.S. began using dual-mode phones that support 800 AMPS as one standard and their 
digital choice as the other.  The presence of 800 AMPS enables nationwide roaming but increases the 
manufacturing cost of the handset and does not allow consumers to retain their handsets if they choose 
an alternate carrier supporting a different standard.  The literature suggests that consumers win as 
common standards typically heighten competition causing reduced prices, enhanced services and 
increased quality.xxix  The GSM standard, with its early support in Europe and other key markets, had the 
added allure of promising higher global demand than CDMA. 
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Table 4. Key criteria for technology adopters 1990-1995 
Criterion  TDMA IS-54 
(Ericsson) 
GSM 
(Ericsson) 
CDMA IS-95 
(Qualcomm) 
Availability 1992 1991 1995 
Capacity enhancements 
over analog  
3–6 times 6–10 times 10–20 times 
Compatibility with 
analog infrastructure 
Backward compatible Incompatible Incompatible 
Known presence of 
scale economies 
Initially thought to be 
medium to high, but 
declines to low over 
time 
Highly certain  Initially uncertain but 
becomes medium over 
time 
Perceived service quality Inferior Superior Superior 
Ability to support 
complex Data services 
Low High High 
Degree of decision risk 
surrounding adoption 
due to stranded 
infrastructure 
Initially low but 
increases to medium 
Low Initially high but 
declines to low  
Ability for seamless 
international roaming 
Low  Medium Initially low but 
increases to medium 
 
6.3.3 Key Equipment Manufacturers 
 
 
Many firms that produce handsets also manufacture equipment for the infrastructure.  Key equipment 
manufacturers that are important in this analysis are Motorola, AT&T Network Systems (Lucent), Nokia 
and Northern Telecom (Nortel). These firms, with Ericsson, represented the top equipment and handset 
manufacturers offering service to the U.S. market at the time of the 2G standards contest. Even though 
these manufacturers supported multiple digital wireless standards, they tended to emphasize TDMA-
based standards or CDMA.  Therefore, they can be described as ”choosing a side” within the standards 
contest, although the evidence of this is marginal.  This is important since their support and dedication to 
a particular standard impacts the perception of service providers’ ability to supply equipment in a timely 
and seamless manner.   
Motorola was the earliest supporter of CDMA, entering into a development agreement with 
Qualcomm in late 1989.  This agreement was a hedge against the possibility that CDMA might eventually 
dominate.  In addition, Motorola supported TDMA and GSM, developing and manufacturing equipment for 
these networks as well.  AT&T Network Systems was also an early advocate of CDMA and committed 
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funding for its development in mid-1990.  This support continued even as AT&T Wireless, a separate 
entity, was choosing to deploy a TDMA-based network.  Motorola, AT&T Network Systems and Qualcomm 
would be the largest beneficiaries of a successful CDMA standard.   
On the other side of the contest we see Ericsson clearly supporting TDMA and GSM.  Both Northern 
Telecom and Nokia also support these standards but in addition display support for CDMA.  Northern 
Telecom publicly displays its support for the CDMA standard through a partnership agreement to 
manufacture infrastructure with Qualcomm in late 1994.  However even with this late hedge, Northern 
Telecom, Nokia and Ericsson are seen as the clear winners if the GSM standard dominates the U.S. 
market.  Today, all of these firms, including Ericsson, produce equipment complying with both the CDMA 
and GSM 2G digital standards and with the newer 3G digital standards.     
 
6.3.4 Software Developers 
 
 
The wireless industry also supports providers of software applications for use within both the handset and 
the base equipment.  These companies range from large, well-known ones like Sun Microsystems to 
newer, more application specific ones like SmartVideo Technologies. These firms share some 
responsibility for the success or failure of the standards.  Since their choice is down market, their 
influence is not as great as that of the network providers or the equipment manufacturers, but sufficient 
demand must exist prior to one of these firms committing to the development of the software necessary 
for the equipment to function.  Their support is required before the results of the standards battle are 
evident, as software development is essential in prototypes and in technical and market trials.  
 
 
 
6.4 INFORMATION SHARING – ASPECTS OF MESSAGE, MEDIA AND TARGET 
 
 
6.4.1 Whom to influence 
 
 
This analysis investigates the key actors in the standard setting process that took place in the U.S. 
market during 1988-1998.  The focus is on the decisions of service providers, since they are the link 
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between the manufacturers and end users.  Their actions and commitments at the firm level will be a key 
source of data for this assessment.  Other influential actors are the equipment providers, as their role 
includes developing the standards from the onset, generally being the technology sponsors and 
committing to manufacture and distribute products for a standard.  Their decisions directly impact and 
affect service providers’ choices.  The interaction between these two groups provides evidence of 
information sharing being used to influence the choice of a technical standard. 
The standard setting process for CDMA and particularly GSM involved a high degree of regulatory 
influence, and the revolutionary natures of CDMA and GSM required a significant degree of interactions 
among industry players in order to gather the quantity and quality of both technical and non-technical 
information required for standard selection.  The process by which TDMA was initially selected by the 
CTIA appears more reflective of what Das and Van De Ven (2000) suggest is a technical process with 
agreement being reached on technical merits in a timely fashion.  However the process gains complexity 
as the decision enters the market, and even in the case of TDMA, the characteristics of the standard 
selection process align themselves more with those of an institutional strategy, due to the fragmentation 
of the wireless technology and the need to convince multiple interest groups of the superiority of one 
technology over another.   
 
6.4.2 How does it occur? 
 
 
In the 2G standard setting process, broadcast mechanisms were used to try to frame the debate.  These 
included press releases, news stories, white papers, speeches at industry conferences or symposia, and 
Internet forums.  Cascade techniques were also employed, such as personal relationships through 
alliances, and cooperative agreements that were facilitated through technical committees and industry 
groups.   
Press releases are generally issued by technology sponsors and early adopters to announce key 
benefits or significant events.  Their impact is industry wide if not beyond.  White papers are generally 
developed by technology sponsors on a stand alone basis or in conjunction with already committed 
service providers.  Their sphere of influence, although large, is generally limited to industry actors.  
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Speeches and symposia are generally targeted at specific actors within the industry, primarily those in 
attendance, and can be expected to have less widespread influence.  Finally, Internet forums are the 
least controllable aspect of broadcast information sharing.  The message delivered in these venues is 
solely determined by the writer, and anyone having on-line access can participate.  Internet forums tend 
to have the most limited span of influence, typically directed at select groups of users who participate in 
the activity, but can be a way to influence adopters. 
In highly complex and fragmented industries, organized groups evolve in order to facilitate 
coordination of the activities of all the participating firms.  In the telecommunication industry, cooperative 
technical organizations (CTOs) are used as a central coordination point for the dissemination of 
information on many aspects of a standard (Dokko & Rosenkopf, 2004).  These groups are influential in 
the selection of a standard and in some cases their influence may actually determine a standard.  In the 
U.S., the key groups are the CTIA, the CDMA development group formed in 1993 and the North American 
GSM alliance, formed in 1997.  These groups provided opportunities for personal contact among 
technology sponsors, adopters and manufacturers.  Within the CTIA, representatives from interested 
firms sought to influence others to support their technology.  All parties involved attempt to agree on 
migration paths and the components of the technical standard (Dokko & Rosenkopf, 2004).  Membership 
in CTIA included all relevant manufacturers and service providers within this analysis and at least one 
license holder in each of the U.S. markets.xxx  Its board in 1995 included Ericsson, Motorola, PCS PrimeCo 
and Pacific Telecom.  The membership of the CDMA development group initially included 17 companies, 
all already committed to the advancement of the standard.  This is similar to the GSM development 
group, which represented the interests of both service providers and manufacturers committed to the 
delivery of GSM.  The contacts formulated within these committees represent the foundation for much of 
the alliance activity and relationship building.  Rosenkopf, Metiu and Varghese (2001) suggest that 
participation in these technical committees provides access to and control of technical and strategic 
knowledge, and that this venue provides a pre-alliance context in which firms communicate and identify 
opportunities for future collaboration.  
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6.4.3 When does it Occur? 
 
 
For the 2G case, the development phase was the most critical for the sharing of information that would 
convince key adopters to move forward with the final development of both the GSM and the CDMA 
standards.  In GSM, the first key adopters that Ericsson needed to influence were the governments of 
West Germany and France. Later, as the standard gained worldwide momentum, Ericsson would focus on 
the network operators in North America.  In contrast, Qualcomm needed to influence major network 
operators and manufacturers in the U.S. and globally.  Qualcomm recognized that for the CDMA standard 
to endure, support was needed from a major service provider and manufacturer early in the standard 
setting process.xxxi   For TDMA IS-54, endorsement by the CTIA was the trigger event that allowed it to 
become part of the U.S. standard setting process. 
As the standard selection process moved into the adoption phase, the bandwagon effect began.  A 
series of key adopters publicly announced their choice of a standard, and this solidarity helped engage 
the support of other firms.  “When PrimeCo and Sprint PCS chose to implement CDMA, it was clear to us 
that we could move forward with our CDMA plan and be compatible with other PCS service providers 
around us.”xxxii  Finally in the diffusion phase it is evident which technology each adopter chose to 
support as they begin to purchase equipment and build infrastructure.        
 
 
 
6.5 EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE STANDARDS CONTEST 
 
 
The market for wireless phone service in the U.S. began more than 25 years ago. Initial cellular service in 
the U.S. was analog, based on the Advanced Mobile Phone System (AMPS) standard which relied on 
frequency division technology (FDMA) in the 800 MHz to 900 MHz bands.  AMPS is considered to be a 
first generation (1G) solution. AMPS or some version of it was the dominant worldwide standard 
throughout the 1980s and is still used in many locations today to supplement digital coverage.    
The European market used a variety of different analog standards.  Britain, Germany, France, Italy 
and the Nordic countries all had their own proprietary systems.  The fractured nature of these multiple 
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systems hindered system interoperability and continent-wide roaming. They were ill equipped to handle 
the growing demand of wireless users.  These factors forced the European countries to begin searching 
for a better solution well ahead of American wireless carriers.xxxiii 
In the mid-1980s, the European Union was already concerned about the sustainability and 
interoperability of its wireless systems.  Frustrated with the slow progress of the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU), an arm of the United Nations that was responsible to lead discussions 
for a common global standard, the European Union in 1988 mandated that the common standard within 
its borders be GSM.xxxiv   
Launched in 1988, the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) was designed to 
promote regional harmonization of cellular networks in Europe.  Group Special Mobile, the standards 
group dedicated to the development of radio and telephone systems in Europe, had been working on a 
new European standard since 1982.  This group was moved under the auspices of ETSI in 1989. 
Based on time division multiplexing, GSM is a digital technology that operates in the 900 MHz and 
1800 MHz frequency bands. The selected design is based on a proposal by Ericsson, but between the 
devising of initial concepts for the standard in 1982, and the completion of standard specifications in 
1988, a wide variety of industry participants was actively involved in the development of the GSM 
standard.  The 2nd Generation (2G) standard-setting process in Europe was characterized by a high 
degree of political behavior.  Certain member countries tried to foster acceptance of a standard that was 
developed by a manufacturer located in their own country.  This proved an obstacle for Ericsson, which 
was based in a country that was not yet a European Union member.  Ericsson ultimately found it 
necessary to forge agreements and joint ventures with both German- and French-based companies. 
The cellular carriers or service providers in the United States in the mid-80s were developing similar 
concerns regarding the ongoing viability of the AMPS standard.  Just a few years after the initial launch of 
cellular service in 1983, customer demand had far exceeded expectations.xxxv   Wireless traffic congestion 
was affecting urban areas like Los Angeles and New York.  U.S. service providers were aware of and 
interested in what was occurring in Europe with the GSM standard.  Digital systems were recognized as 
offering more efficient use of the available spectrum.  Many equipment suppliers were active participants 
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in the European standard setting process for GSM.  Even Motorola, a U.S.-based equipment manufacturer 
that had not serviced the European market in the past, recognized the future potential of GSM and was 
participating with the likes of Ericsson, Siemens, Alcatel and Nokia.    
The FCC did not choose to mandate a single standard for use in the U.S.  It decided to allow the 
industry and the market to determine which wireless digital standard would become dominant.   This is 
similar to the FCC’s strategy for the development of the analog cellular standard in the early 1980s and 
reflects the trend away from government-led standards selection, which began in the late 1970s.  There 
exist two sides to this argument regarding the relative roles of government and industry in technical 
standard setting and the function of the marketplace in the absence of clear technological standards. The 
first side clearly identifies the benefits of a common technical standard early in the process.  It can 
increase price competition and thus demand.  It increases compatibility and interoperability and can 
increase the use of the technology, giving the installed base enhanced economic and functional value.  At 
the same time, standard setting can thwart innovation and entrench an older standard when a newer, 
better or more widely accepted technology is available.  
The Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA) was founded in 1984.  It is an 
industry-led group consisting of both network operators and manufacturers. The purpose of the CTIA was 
to represent its members’ interests with policy makers in the Executive Branch, in the Federal 
Communications Commission and in Congress.  In addition, it offered its members a certification program 
that was unbiased, independent and centralized. The CTIA took an active interest in the 2G standard 
setting process in the U.S. In September 1988, it published a set of User Performance Requirements 
(UPR) that encouraged the industry to develop a digital wireless standard with at least ten times the 
capacity of current analog networks, in addition to better reliability and quality.xxxvi  In January 1989, its 
membership voted to endorse the time-based method (TDMA) of digital communications for cellular 
systems based on an Ericsson proposal. The technical name for this standard became IS-54.  Numerous 
U.S. network operators had tested time-based methods and were comfortable with both the capabilities 
and limitations of this technological standard.xxxvii For many operators it offered a swift solution to 
growing capacity concerns.  
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In late 1988, Qualcomm began work on a code-based signaling method based on spread spectrum.  
This technological standard, which came to be known as CDMA, was a significant departure from the 
more familiar TDMA-based wireless standard.  The process associated with its functioning was complex 
and appeared to many industry experts to be beyond the reaches of the current technology.xxxviii  
Nonetheless, believing in CDMA technology, Qualcomm began to introduce key industry players to CDMA 
by 1989.  Qualcomm’s senior management team, led by CEO Irwin Jacobs, launched a campaign 
designed to create awareness of CDMA and its benefits.   
 
 
 
6.6 THE AUCTION PROCESS INSTIGATES CHOICE 
 
 
Radio spectrum is a limited commodity that is managed by the federal government.  Spectrum for 2G 
wireless was allotted in the 1.8 GHz to 2.2 GHz radio frequency band.  In late 1993, the FCC announced 
its decision to allocate spectrum to the U.S. market for wireless service providers through an auction 
process, with the licenses awarded to the highest bidders.  The continental USA was divided into 46 
MTAs (major trading areas), with licenses available in each MTA.  The main round of auctions was slated 
for December 1994, and the FCC received 74 bid applications for 99 wireless licenses.  Since bidding 
required detailed information on anticipated costs and revenues, many service operators were forced to 
finalize their choice of technical standard in order to participate in the auctions.  The FCC, although 
imposing very few service requirements on the licenses, did place restrictions on the timeframes for 
service deployment.xxxix  PCS service providers who purchased licenses in the auctions were required to 
begin offering service within two years or face possible forfeit of their licenses.xl They were also required 
to pay half of their spectrum license fee within the first week after receiving the license and the 
remaining half within one year.xli  For national operators who purchased large blocks of spectrum, this 
required being ready to pay the FCC extremely large sums of capital quite quickly and further instigated 
the industry movement towards digital service.  In total, these initial auctions raised over $7 billion for 
the FCC.   
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6.7 CASE DETAILS:  INFORMATION SHARING EVENTS CHRONICLED 
 
 
This focus of this analysis is on the information sharing actions and events displayed by two key actors, 
Ericsson and Qualcomm, and how throughout the standards contest, these emerge as strategies to 
influence adoption.  Ericsson or Qualcomm was responsible for the development and marketing of the 
three competing standards: TDMA, GSM and CDMA.  Even though other manufacturers were also 
involved in this activity, Ericsson and Qualcomm were the primary drivers of adoption.  It is through their 
actions that each of these standards was involved in the standard setting processes during 1988-2000. 
Since the advent of 2G wireless alters the traditional national market approach, which was common 
throughout the 1980s, it will be enlightening to also include certain aspects of the European 2G standard 
setting process, as events that occurred there are influential on the outcome in the U.S., especially in 
relation to the GSM standard.   
 
6.7.1 Ericsson promotes GSM 
 
 
The Standards contest for GSM officially began in Stockholm in 1982.  Representatives, including network 
operators, wireless equipment manufacturers, universities and governments from 11 European countries, 
gathered at an inaugural meeting for the development of the GSM technical standard.  This was the first 
and most important part of the standards contest for Ericsson, as having their technical design accepted 
as the European Standard would be the foundation upon which all the remaining competition would build.  
Over the next five years, the system requirements and technical details of the standard were defined.   
Eight prototype systems were evaluated, with the results presented at a landmark plenary session in 
February 1987.  The GSM standardization process was politically driven, with the governments of the 
European Union actively involved in the design, development and selection of a 2G wireless standard.  
The evaluation process utilized in the selection of GSM consisted of both political compromise and 
engineering assessment, with influences arising from national vested interests for one version of a 
standard over another.xlii   The technology selection process most closely followed the institutional 
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strategy described earlier by Van de Ven.  Firms, distributors and regulators influenced the selection 
among alternatives, and selection was based on both technical and non-technical aspects of the 
standards.          
Ericsson particularly influenced this phase of the European 2G standard setting process.    Even 
though the process was controlled by governments, there still existed the same relationship building and 
support solicitation evident within a de facto or market-based process.  Both the French and West 
German governments strongly subsidized the development of suitable technology, hoping to ensure a 
lead position for their national industries.  They were strongly advocating proposals designed for areas of 
high population density.  Other members were keenly interested in less complex technologies designed to 
operate in areas of medium density.  In late 1986, Ericsson issued a proposal that bridged these 
differences, and this was advocated by many of the actors in the decision process.  However, it quickly 
became evident that France and West Germany, both critical to the acceptance of Ericsson’s proposal, 
would not back this decision since the proposal did not come from a French or West German company.  
Ericsson quickly reacted by negotiating agreements with LTC, a French network operator, and Siemens, a 
large West German manufacturer. Ericsson agreed to an exchange of technology with LTC and forged a 
cooperative development agreement with Siemens.xliii  Geroski (2000) describes how a critical few can 
influence the process of choice, and when these actors accept a technology, the bandwagon effect can 
begin.  This process generally happens through relationships that facilitate the persuasion, negotiation 
and coordination of key adopters.  Ericsson forged and employed direct relationships with both LTC and 
Siemens that enabled the transfer of the critical information that tipped the balance in its favor.   
This process of directly imparting information through relationships or employing information 
cascades, endured as the government of West Germany continued to have difficulty accepting the 
development of the technical features associated with the GSM standard.  Diplomatic efforts were 
employed once again in early 1987 among the heads of state of the United Kingdom, West Germany, 
France and Italy.  Once again, strategic information sharing was used to sway West Germany that it was 
best to act in the interests of the deployment of GSM rather than in the interest of its own industries.xliv  
GSM, based largely on Ericsson’s proposed TDMA technology design, became the standard of choice for 
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the European Community.  This example of strategic information sharing at a critical juncture in the GSM 
standard setting process is evidence of the impact that information cascades can have on key adopters’ 
actions. 
Once Ericsson’s version of the GSM standard became the accepted choice by Europe, there was 
worldwide recognition that sufficient demand would be available to justify the manufacture of equipment.  
This generated interest in the use of the GSM standard in much of the world, including the U.S.  In the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, cellular service providers in the U.S. were very much aware of the standard 
setting and development activities going on in Europe and were beginning their own inquiries regarding 
the move from 1G to 2G wireless standards.  Previously, the U.S. market for wireless services could be 
characterized as having smooth, continuous growth.xlv  All networks were using the AMPS standard, 
giving rise to great economies of scale.  Spectrum limitation issues began to occur in dense urban cores 
like the city centers of New York and Los Angeles.  The CTIA took up the development of new technology 
to combat capacity shortages in wireless networks.   
 
6.7.2 Ericsson Wins Again with TDMA 
 
 
An offshoot of the CTIA, the TIA (Telecommunications Industry Association) is a supplier’s trade 
organization for wireless networks. The TIA endorsed the development of a TDMA standard.  Its primary 
concern was to have a standard compatible with current architecture to minimize upgrade problems.  
Ericsson’s TDMA IS-54 offered the benefits of three-fold increased capacity and a seamless transition 
path.  It did not contain all the same features and functionality that GSM offered but was based on the 
original Ericsson proposal for GSM.  Therefore, in the U.S. market, Ericsson became a strong supporter of 
TDMA and throughout both the development and adoption stages of the standard setting process, 
attempted to convince key actors of its superiority over CDMA.   
Ericsson also remained a strong advocate of the GSM standard, and along with Siemens, Motorola 
and Nokia, dominated the supply side of the market for both GSM terminals and infrastructure well into 
the mid 1990s.xlvi   Most manufacturers eventually agreed to develop product for all competing standards, 
even CDMA, but Ericsson continued to only support TDMA IS-54 and GSM.xlvii  Ericsson felt there was little 
 7/25/2006   70
risk that any standard developed would surpass the benefits of its GSM version, and it continued to 
publicly advocate adoption of GSM to service providers worldwide through a constant barrage of white 
papers and press releases.xlviii   
 
6.7.3 TDMA Takes the Lead 
 
 
Throughout the development of the CDMA standard by Qualcomm, Ericsson carried out a campaign 
aimed at discrediting it.   Ericsson utilized a broadcast campaign comprised of fear, uncertainty and 
doubt. This campaign created noise and confusion in the environment.  At critical junctures in the 
development of CDMA, Ericsson attempted to discredit the superiority claims being made by Qualcomm. 
It issued numerous public statements between 1992 and 1994, the critical juncture for CDMA, disputing 
the claimed advantages of CDMA.xlix  During this period, Qualcomm was having difficulty delivering on 
some of its promises regarding the readiness of CDMA.  Ericsson and other advocates of both the GSM 
and TDMA standards exploited this weakness through public statements that identified GSM and TDMA as 
“proven technologies ready for deployment,” whereas they suggested that CDMA was still “many months 
away from being deployable.”l  Ericsson issued a series of white papers that warn of possible technical 
problems with CDMA. One of these papers in particular concluded there were no capacity or voice quality 
differences between CDMA and GSM.li  Proof of the effectiveness of this Ericsson-led information-sharing 
plan was the failure once again of the CTIA to endorse CDMA in January 1992.  
As a concession, the CTIA announced an open forum for the purpose of reviewing the opportunity 
for a wideband spread spectrum technology like CDMA to be approved.  Ericsson took this opportunity to 
continue its campaign to discredit CDMA and, in an attempt to delay the process of accreditation by the 
CTIA, argued over details of the components of the standard at every opportunity. It voted against 
supporting the CDMA standard at an April 16th meeting of the CTIA, where 21 voted in favor, 4 voted 
against and 2 abstained.lii   Finally, recognizing how important it was for Qualcomm to have a major 
manufacturer on board in order to entice the commitment and support of network operators, Ericsson 
refused to develop CDMA equipment in the hope that this lack of support would signal to the 2G wireless 
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world its skepticism regarding Qualcomm’s claims and convince other equipment manufacturers to 
withhold support for CDMA.   
The momentum for TDMA in the U.S. market became recognizable in early 1992.  Rapidly following 
the failure of the CTIA to endorse CDMA, Southwestern Bell (SBC) signaled its commitment to TDMA and 
announced its intention to order TDMA equipment from Ericsson.  Later that same year, McCaw Cellular 
(now AT&T Wireless) also announced its intent to commit to TDMA and deploy infrastructure in its Florida 
markets in early 1993.  Ericsson spent millions of dollars throughout 1992 highlighting the benefits of 
TDMA and GSM in the trade press and on industry forums.liii  This momentum slowed, however, when 
Ameritech announced the results of its market and technology trial for TDMA in mid-1993.  Ameritech 
publicly backed away from the TDMA standard and outlined a number of issues that convinced it to 
support CDMA.liv     
During the earlier years of the standard setting process, Ericsson focused on the promotion of the 
TDMA standard into the U.S. market.  As the results of the market and technical trials, such as 
Ameritech’s, began to suggest that TDMA had operational issues, Ericsson shifted the focus of its U.S. 
promotional efforts from TDMA to GSM.  Throughout the process, however, Ericsson’s primary message 
was disbelief in CDMA claims, concentrating its campaign of fear, uncertainty and doubt during the time 
period of 1992–1993, which is post-development stage.        
 
6.7.4 Ericsson Signs up Support for both TDMA and GSM 
 
 
Overall, Ericsson was able to sway the major network operators McCaw Cellular, Southwestern Bell, 
Western Wireless and Bellsouth to use TDMA and GSM.   Of these, the most significant is AT&T Wireless, 
the largest cellular carrier at 78.757 million points of presence (POPs).lv The manufacturers that 
committed to support GSM due to its level of global acceptance, also publicly stated their support for 
TDMA through press releases and white papers very early on in the adoption stage.  These 
manufacturers were Northern Telecom (Nortel), Nokia and Motorola.  There is no evidence available 
suggesting that a personal relationship between any of these manufacturers and Ericsson was the reason 
behind their support of these standards.  Rather, it can be assumed that due to GSM’s global popularity 
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and the CTIA’s endorsement of TDMA, the decision to develop infrastructure equipment and handsets for 
these standards was a fait accompli.    
Between 1994 and 1997, numerous press releases announced the above network operators’ 
commitment to TDMA or GSM, based on their availability and proven performance. Pacific Bell signed a 
$300 million deal with Ericsson for purchase of GSM equipment; Omnipoint launched GSM-based service 
in November of 1996; and AT&T announced a rollout of commercial service based on TDMA in December 
of 1996.  Within the U.S., this stage culminated with the formation of the GSM alliance group, a 
consortium of 7 regional GSM operators who supported GSM.  Their focus was on promoting GSM 
technology and improving the roaming agreements between various GSM carriers in order to improve the 
ease of use for the end user.   
 
6.7.5 Qualcomm and CDMA 
 
 
Qualcomm began work on the CDMA standard in 1988 and, until 1995, endeavored to alter the 
perception of network operators worldwide that CDMA was complex and risky, into regard for CDMA as 
proven and accepted. Since CDMA was a revolutionary change for U.S. service operators, and a less risky 
path existed to transition to either TDMA IS-95 (IS–136) or GSM, Qualcomm had to highlight the benefits 
of CDMA and dissipate the momentum that TDMA or GSM had with manufacturers and service providers.  
It became necessary for Qualcomm to develop an information-sharing strategy to encourage both 
manufacturers and service providers to fully support CDMA.  Qualcomm’s basic message to the industry 
was as follows: CDMA was the future, investing in it now will give you an advantage in time to market, 
we will reduce your risk through allowing you to try the technology before you buy it, and we will 
continue to support all your technical needs.lvi     
CDMA was considered a complex technical standard because its use of spread-spectrum technology 
was a complete departure from other wireless technologies available in the late 1980s.  Educating 
potential adopters regarding the unique aspects and proposed benefits of CDMA required the transfer of 
large amounts of rich qualitative information.  This required personal relationships and repeat interactions 
in order for the full intent of the message to be delivered.  Communicating to key adopters the technical 
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specifications and abilities of the CDMA standard necessitated the utilization of a cascade information 
sharing strategy. 
In February 1989, Qualcomm began influencing key adopters.  It identified and undertook  
personal visits to a few key network operators, PacTel Cellular, the cellular division of Pacific Telesis; 
Ameritech, with head office in Chicago; and NYNEX, servicing New York.  All three operators’ serviced 
densely populated areas with high capacity requirements.  CDMA’s superior capacity claims seemed ideal 
for their needs.  In addition, Qualcomm identified PacTel as an operator that possessed a reputation for 
innovativeness, and was known to possess doubts regarding the long term functionality of the recently 
approved TDMA IS-95 standard.  PacTel was also located in close proximity to Qualcomm’s San Diego 
office.  Irwin Jacobs, CEO of Qualcomm, visited chief engineers and senior management at PacTel on 
more than one occasion throughout 1989, introducing them to CDMA, identifying the planned benefits 
associated with the standard and building a relationship that would be critical to the success of CDMA in 
the future.lvii  This resulted in a form of commitment by PacTel to CDMA; they agreed to provide funding 
of $2 million for the further development of the technology in return for Qualcomm’s commitment to a 
live trial of the technology in San Diego in November 1989.lviii  
In July 1990, failing a more formalized mechanism for the development of a detailed technical 
description of a standard, Qualcomm released its ”Green Book” – a compilation of draft standard 
specifications – and requested feedback from CDMA supporters. Throughout 1989 and 1990, Qualcomm 
senior executives were constantly in the news media proclaiming “CDMA is superior” and “CDMA is ready 
to go.”  Recognizing that certain international markets held tremendous opportunity for wireless 
communications and the importance of obtaining as many supporters as possible in a short time period, 
Qualcomm invited numerous international governments and operators to demonstrations and symposia in 
late 1989.  The government of South Korea identified itself as a likely early adopter of CDMA technology, 
and Qualcomm sent senior representatives there to make a series of presentations in mid- to late 1990 
that described CDMA technology as the optimum choice to meet that country’s unique capacity needs.  
This effort was rewarded when in late 1991; Qualcomm and the Korean government announced a joint 
development agreement for CDMA in South Korea worth $17 million.lix        
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A key tactic in a standards war is the management of expectations.  The most direct way to 
manage expectations is by assembling allies and making grand claims about your product’s future or 
current popularity (Shapiro & Varian, 1999).  In conjunction with information cascades, we see 
Qualcomm attuned to the management of expectations as it began to take the CDMA message to a 
broader audience and incorporate the use of broadcast techniques in the communication of a 
straightforward message: CDMA is the best commercial alternative for the 2G wireless market.  In June 
1989, Irwin Jacobs gave a presentation on CDMA to the CTIA standards committee, attempting to begin 
the process of delivering the benefits of the standard to the larger community. In Fall 1989, Qualcomm 
hired a public relations firm to develop an awareness campaign for CDMA, which resulted in a senior level 
representative from Qualcomm speaking about CDMA at every industry conference and symposium 
through the remainder of 1989.lx  Another broadcast technique employed by Qualcomm was live 
demonstrations, conducting live trials in both San Diego and New York.  It used these to showcase the 
abilities of the technology and invited manufacturers and network operators to attend.  These 
demonstrations signaled to potential adopters the commercial viability of this revolutionary standard.  
Qualcomm recognized that no network carrier would likely invest in a technology that could only be 
provided by a single source, and that one of its key adopters would therefore need to be an equipment 
manufacturer.  The endorsement by PacTel prompted Motorola to join Qualcomm and PacTel in a 
development agreement for CDMA technology as early as 1989.  This activity resulted in Motorola’s 
becoming an early licensee of Qualcomm’s CDMA in mid-1990.  Northern Telecom and AT&T Networks 
also became early licensees of CDMA, influenced by Ameritech’s and Nynex’s early support of CDMA.lxi 
That these equipment manufacturers let their support be known was an important signal of CDMA’s 
legitimacy.       
 
6.7.6 Qualcomm Spreads the Message 
 
 
Qualcomm was undeterred by its failure to obtain CTIA endorsement for CDMA in January 1992.  
Immediately following the CTIA’s announcement, Qualcomm accelerated its information sharing strategy, 
with Irwin Jacobs publicly stating his commitment to have CDMA commercially viable within 12 months.lxii   
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In May of that year, Qualcomm and PacTel launched an aggressive public relations campaign targeted at 
network operators.  Their focus was twofold: to assure the industry that CDMA remained a viable option 
and to influence the outcome of the CTIA’s open forum process on a wideband spread spectrum 
technology.   
In August 1992, US West New Vector announced it will adopt CDMA technology and sign purchase 
agreements for equipment with Motorola and Northern Telecom (Nortel). Quickly following, Bell Atlantic 
Mobile (BAMS) announced its intent to use CDMA.  Both PacTel and Ameritech strongly advocated 
support for CDMA at the CTIA board meetings in March and July 1993, resulting in the CTIA’s 
endorsement of IS-95 as an interim CDMA standard.          
Whereas Ericsson effectively used trade associations and technical committees to promote GSM 
and TDMA, Qualcomm avoided these venues and relied heavily on its alliance partners and supporters for 
continued diffusion of its message.  In late 1993, Qualcomm formed the CDMA development group, 
consisting of key supporters of CDMA in the U.S., in order to continue spreading the CDMA message in 
the U.S. and globally.lxiii 
 
6.7.7 Support for CDMA Continues 
 
 
1994 brought the PCS Auctions and the network operators’ open commitment for their standards choices.  
Upon completion of the A/B block PCS auctions, CDMA emerged as the leading digital wireless technology 
in the U.S. marketplace. Most significant was the choice by Sprint Telecommunications Venture to use 
CDMA. After the auctions, Sprint Spectrum held 163 million POPs, making it the largest provider of 
wireless service in the U.S. market, and it announced in July 1995 that it would deploy CDMA technology 
because it represented the best long-term solution for a seamless national wireless network. "Sprint 
Telecommunications Venture has selected CDMA as the best technology for its customers, and has 
selected Nortel/Qualcomm because of our product architecture and CDMA network expertise," said Irwin 
Jacobs. Even though this announcement was a broadcast directed at the industry, many prior personal 
visits by Jacobs to Sprint senior engineers were considered very convincing and a large factor in Sprint’s 
technology choice.lxiv Other important companies that selected CDMA were BAMS, Nynex, US West and 
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PacTel, which formed the consortium PCS PrimeCo.  They announced their support in June 1995 and 
boasted the third largest wireless market holdings at 60 million POPs.  Finally, GTE Mobilenet, which 
provided wireless service to 21 million POPs, also announced its intention to deploy CDMA.  In late 1995, 
Qualcomm claimed that CDMA was becoming the dominant choice for wireless service providers in the US 
market.lxv 
More triumph for Qualcomm came at the end of 1995, when the first commercial CDMA system 
was launched in Hong Kong. Although Hong Kong has one of the world's most difficult terrains and 
congested radio frequency environments, the network delivered outstanding performance. Jack Scanlon, 
executive vice president and general manager of Motorola's Cellular Infrastructure Group, said, "The 
successful deployment of the CDMA Networks in Hong Kong is proof that CDMA will work well anywhere 
in the world." In addition, South Korea announced the launch of its commercial CDMA network in 
December 1995.  Finally, in late 1996, both Sprint PCS (previously STV) and PrimeCo launched 
commercial service in the U.S. In 1997, China placed a $300 million order for Qualcomm CDMA phones. 
 
6.7.8 Who Won – Post 1996  
 
 
As of February 1997, 14% of the U.S. market was covered by TDMA technology, 24% by GSM, and 54% 
by CDMA.  The only significant player to select and deploy TDMA, AT&T Wireless, opted for this choice 
primarily to gain first mover advantages in the market.  As of 2000, it was still gaining subscribers and 
considered a powerhouse in the U.S. wireless market, but the growth in wireless data and the migration 
path to an effective 3rd generation technology were beginning to prove its TDMA choice an impediment.   
Even though GSM was not a big winner in the U.S. market, by 2000 it was deployed and operating in 
over 108 countries, totaling more than 166 million subscribers.  CDMA, although declared the winner by 
many in the U.S., had operations in fewer than half as many countries and claimed only 21 million 
subscribers. 
Qualcomm was able to successfully alter the perception of CDMA as unproven, risky and ill-suited 
to the needs of wireless service operators, enabling CDMA to obtain commercial success and dominate 
both GSM and TDMA in the U.S.  A large part of this success may be attributed to the timing, content and 
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delivery of information and linking of numerous events and actions into a strategy to influence adoption.  
Herschel Shosteck, an industry economist, suggested that Qualcomm “overcame what should have been 
fatal disadvantages with brilliant public relations” (1997).   The relationships it forged and the messages 
it communicated were important to the process of influencing critical key adopters.  The final testament 
to its success was Ericsson’s offer to buy the Qualcomm Infrastructure Division in March 1999, a move 
that legitimized the important role CDMA plays in the wireless world.   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Technology sponsors and their key relationships 
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Figure 8. Indicators of size and influence 
$2 100145$13 600Sprint
$73
$158
0
$82
$398
$1 100
$1 600 
Paid in MTA 
auction (millions)
57$41 600*PCS PrimeCo
7
8
0
11
19
107
Population 
acquired in 
auction (millions)
$13 900SBC
$15 000Ameritech
$18 000MCI
$19 000BellSouth
$21  000GTE
$45 400AT&T wireless
1996 Gross 
Revenue 
(millions)
Sources:  Garrard, Garry, “Cellular communications: Worldwide market development ; FCC website, “How 
the players rate”, Telephony, Jun2 1997 
*Revenues for PCS PrimeCo are compiled from individual revenues for PacTel, Bell Atlantic, Nynex and US 
West  
 7/25/2006   79
 
 
 
 
 
7.0 RESULTS 
 
 
 
 
7.1 PATTERNS IN THE DATA 
 
 
The following charts contain, in chronological order, the information-sharing events documented for the 
case studies.  Tables 5 and 6 identify those information-sharing events associated with the CDMA 
standard and influenced by Qualcomm.  Table 5 provides additional details within the data according to 
the four elements of the strategy: timing, message, media, and target.  Table 6 displays an aggregated 
version of the same data.  Tables 7 and 8 focus on the information-sharing events connected to the 
TDMA and GSM standards and influenced by Ericsson.  Table 7 provides the additional details associated 
with the elements of the strategy, while Table 8 presents an aggregated version of the actions and 
events.   
Certain patterns are evident.  The most obvious is a preponderance of cascade information-sharing 
events early in the standard setting process.  This result supports the first proposition: technology 
sponsors seeking to influence key adopters in a standards contest will rely more heavily on the use of 
cascade information sharing during the standard’s development phase.  It also supports the logic behind 
this prediction: firms require the use of personal relationships in order to deliver the complex and 
ambiguous messages characteristic of a technology in its development phase. Therefore, these cascade 
events are based on the exploitation of relationships and occur via strong ties. They generally involve 
visits to share or develop detailed specifications for the standard or to discuss agreements for funding or 
joint development.  In some cases, complex information is delivered via a written specification that is 
transferred amongst firms. 
Broadcast information sharing is primarily utilized in the latter part of the standards process, 
supporting the second proposition: technology sponsors seeking to influence key adopters in a standards 
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contest will rely more heavily on the use of broadcast information sharing when the technical standard 
has reached the adoption phase.  The broadcasting of information almost always occurs through an 
intermediary or a weak tie and generally involves making claims regarding the standard’s abilities.  The 
primary vehicles for delivery are press releases and industry speeches.  Initially, the claims mainly 
communicate the benefits of the standards being championed.  The positive results of technical and 
market trials are communicated, and posturing surrounding market readiness and technical superiority is 
displayed by technology sponsors.  In some cases, the messages attempt to discredit a competitive 
standard by identifying its weaknesses.  As the standards eventually approach commercial viability, the 
intent of the message begins to shift towards identification of an adopter’s support of a particular 
standard.  When the message communicated becomes associated with commercial deployment, an even 
greater emphasis is placed on broadcast information sharing, with the standard sponsors identifying their 
supporters and successful commercial launches.  
As can be seen from the detailed depictions of the information-sharing events, the target of 
influence, although originally considered an important element of the strategy, does not appear to be a 
core component of determining whether an action or event should be delivered via a cascade or 
broadcast methodology.  Key adopters, the primary target, receive a mix of cascade and broadcast 
information sharing throughout the study period.  There is a trend of more initial contact with key 
adopters and later contact with the overall industry, but when messages are directed at the market or the 
industry, the most efficient and effective way to deliver a message to such a potentially diverse and 
broad target is through broadcast.  Therefore, it seems logical that the key determinant of how an action 
or event should be transferred appears to be aligned with the message content and the timing of 
delivery.  These two elements of the strategy combine to determine the most appropriate method of 
conveyance.  
A given message’s intent is categorized in the detailed data chart to be either informative or 
persuasive, but it may actually be both simultaneously.  The majority of the information sharing events 
identified can be either directly or indirectly construed as persuading key adopters.  This also seems a 
logical conclusion since the essence of a standards contest is persuading key participants to adopt a 
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technology, and influencing them to select one technology over any others is a central goal of a 
technology sponsor’s information-sharing strategy.  Therefore, even if the primary function of an action 
or event is apparently to inform the target, there is generally an underlying intention to also persuade.  
This appears true without regard to the timing of delivery, content of message, or type of media.     
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Table 5. Information sharing events - detailed version: Qualcomm promotes CDMA  
Timing
Qualcomm and CDMA information sharing 
events / activities 1989 - 1997 Message Content
Message 
Complexity
Message 
Intent Media Type Target Media Strategy
Jan-89 CTIA endorses TDMA legitimization of TDMA simple inform press release industry Broadcast
Feb-89 Qualcomm management visit Pactel management 
technical and strategic design 
issues complex persuade face to face meeting single adopter Cascade
Mar-89 Qualcomm management visit Ameritech management
technical and strategic design 
issues complex persuade face to face meeting single adopter Cascade
Apr-89
Qualcomm hires PR firm to develop awareness 
campaign future benefits of technology simple persuade
press releases and 
speeches key adopters Broadcast
Apr - Nov 
1989 
Qualcomm senior level representatives speak about 
CDMA at industry conferences/symposiums future benefits of technology simple persuade industry speeches key adopters Broadcast
Jun-89 Irwin Jacobs gives presentation at CTIA future benefits of technology simple persuade industry speech industry Broadcast
Jul-89
PacTel agrees to provide $2M to Qualcomm for further 
development of CDMA
technical and strategic design 
issues complex inform face to face meeting single adopter Cascade
Jul-89 Qualcomm executives visit NYNEX
technical and strategic design 
issues complex persuade face to face meeting single adopter Cascade
Oct-89 Qualcomm executives visit Ameritech
technical and strategic design 
issues complex persuade face to face meeting single adopter Cascade
Nov-89
Live demonstration at Qualcomm work site, 
manufacturers and operators attend operational issues simple persuade technical trial key adopters Broadcast
Dec-89
Qualcomm / PacTel l/ Motorola reach development 
agreement
technical and strategic design 
issues complex inform face to face meeting key adopters Cascade
Feb-90 Qualcomm & NYNEX conduct live trial in New York operational issues simple persuade technical trial key adopters Broadcast
Mar - Sept 
1990
AT&T, NYNEX, Ameritech, Motorola and PacTel commit 
$30M in further funding for continued development of 
CDMA
technical and strategic design 
issues simple inform face to face meeting key adopters Broadcast
Jul-90
Qualcomm distributes Green Book of CDMA to partners 
and advocates which outlines standard specifications 
and invites input and feedback
technical and strategic design 
issues complex inform
intra-group 
communication key adopters Cascade
Sep-90
Qualcomm senior executive makes series of presentation 
to Korean government (ETRI and MoC) promote technology complex persuade face to face meeting single adopter Cascade
May-91
Qualcomm and ETRI reach Joint development 
agreement technical design issues complex inform face to face meeting single adopter Cascade
Oct-91
Qualcomm distributes Gold Book of CDMA standard 
specifications to partners / advocates- final document 
after revisions final design specifications complex inform
written 
communication key adopters Cascade
Nov-91
Trial of CDMA in San Diego - full fledged cellular network 
- in conjunction with PacTel operational issues simple persuade technical trial key adopters Broadcast
Dec-91 Qualcomm IPO raises $68M investment support simple inform press release industry Broadcast
Dec-91
Dr Irwin Jacobs CEO of Qualcomm publicly states that 
"all questions regarding CDMA have been put to rest" operational readiness simple persuade press release key adopters Broadcast
Jan-92 CTIA fails to endorse Qualcomm's CDMA lack of industry support simple inform press release industry Broadcast
Jan-92
Qualcomm CEO Irwin Jacobs publicly states that CDMA 
will be commercially available in 12 months operational readiness simple persuade press release key adopters Broadcast
May-92
Aggressive PR by Qualcomm / PacTel /Motorola 
targeted at network operators operational readiness simple persuade press release key adopters Broadcast
Jun-92
Ameritech launches 18 month market and technology 
trial of both TDMA and CDMA technical and market issues simple inform press release key adopters Broadcast
Aug-92
US West New Vector announce they will adopt CDMA 
and sign purchase agreements with Motorola and 
Northern Telecom support from key adopter  simple persuade press release key adopters Broadcast
1992
Qualcomm invests millions in communicating the 
benefits of CDMA in trade press and industry forums benefits of technology simple persuade press release key adopters Broadcast    
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Timing
Qualcomm and CDMA information sharing 
events / activities 1989 - 1997 Message Content
Message 
Complexity
Message 
Intent Media Type Target Media Strategy
Mar-93 BAMS announces they will use CDMA support from key adopter  simple persuade press release key adopters Broadcast
Mar-93
Pactel and Ameritech support CDMA at CTIA board 
meeting support from key adopters  complex persuade face to face meeting industry Cascade
Jun-93
US West claims it will have CDMA up and running in its 
Seattle market by late 1994 support from key adopter  simple persuade press release key adopters Broadcast
Jul-93
Ameritech backs away from TDMA, claims market and 
technology trial does not support adoption of TDMA legitimization of CDMA simple persuade press release key adopters Broadcast
Jul-93
CTIA endorses Qualcomm's CDMA as an interim 
standard IS-95 legitimization of CDMA simple inform press release industry Broadcast
Dec-93
CDMA development group formed - 17 companies - 
press release identifies capacity benefits of CDMA benefits of technology simple inform press release industry Broadcast
Dec-93
CDMA development group - acts as mechanism for 
sharing information and building relationships
network of relationships for 
Qualcomm complex persuade
ongoing 
communication group members Cascade
Jan-94
Thomas Crawford, Director of marketing at Qualcomm - 
press release stating "CDMA is ready to go" technology readiness simple persuade press release key adopters Broadcast
1994
Qualcomm makes public claims via press releases, news 
media, speeches regarding the technical superiority of 
CDMA  benefits of technology simple persuade
press releases and 
speeches key adopters Broadcast
Dec-94
Qualcomm and Northern Telecom sign agreement for the 
joint manufacture of infrastructure equipment for CDMA
equipment development 
issues complex inform face to face meeting single adopter Cascade
Dec-94 Digital Spectrum Auctions  - $7B raised
triggers industry wide 
adoption simple inform industry event industry Broadcast
Jun-95 PCS PrimeCo announce they will use CDMA support from key adopter simple inform press release industry Broadcast
Jul-95
Sprint Technology Ventures (STV) publicly supports their 
choice of CDMA support from key adopter simple persuade press release industry Broadcast
Oct-95
Hutchinson Telephone of Hong Kong announces launch 
of first commercial CDMA network infrastructure deployed simple inform press release
market & key 
adopters Broadcast
Oct-95
Qualcomm claims that Sprint, GTE, Ameritech, AirTouch, 
Bell Atlantic, NYNEX and US West are all committed to 
the commercial use of CDMA industry support simple persuade press release key adopters Broadcast
Dec-95
South Korea announces launch of commercial CDMA 
network infrastructure deployed simple inform press release
market & key 
adopters Broadcast
Jan-96
STV requests Motorola to provide last minute financial 
guarantees in case of system failures  for CDMA roll-out
lack of support from key 
adopter simple inform press release industry Broadcast
Jan-96
Motorola refuses to provide guarantees to STV; Nortel / 
Lucent agree to performance guarantees support from key adopter complex persuade face to face meeting group of adopters Cascade
Feb-96
Qualcomm claims 10 of top 14 Cellular operators have 
committed to CDMA industry support simple persuade press release key adopters Broadcast
Mar-96
CDMA development group announce deployment of 
CDMA in India, China, Brazil, Indonesia and Russia infrastructure deployed simple persuade press release key adopters Broadcast
Nov-96
STV commits to massive launch with CDMA prior to year 
end support from key adopter simple inform press release industry Broadcast
Nov-96
Primeco announces it will launch CDMA service in 
several markets support from key adopter simple persuade press release key adopters Broadcast
Feb-97 China places $300M order to Qualcomm CDMA phones support from key adopter simple inform press release key adopters Broadcast  
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Table 6. Information sharing events - aggregated version: Qualcomm promotes CDMA        
Jan-89 CTIA endorses TDMA Broadcast
Feb-89 Qualcomm management visit Pactel management - series of meetings ensues throughout 1989 Cascade
Mar-89 Qualcomm management visit Ameritech management Cascade
Apr-89 Qualcomm hires PR firm to develop awareness campaign Broadcast
Apr - Nov 1989 At every industry conference or symposium, Qualcomm sent senior level representatives to speak about CDMA Broadcast
Jun-89 Irwin Jacobs gives presentation at CTIA Broadcast
Jul-89 PacTel agrees to provide $2M to Qualcomm for further development of CDMA Cascade
Jul-89 Qualcomm executives visit NYNEX Cascade
Oct-89 Qualcomm executives visit Ameritech Cascade
Nov-89 Live demonstration at Qualcomm work site, manufacturers and operators attend Broadcast
Dec-89 Qualcomm / PacTel l/ Motorola reach development agreement Cascade
Feb-90 Qualcomm & NYNEX conduct live trial in New York Broadcast
Mar - Sept 1990 AT&T, NYNEX, Ameritech, Motorola and PacTel commit $30M in further funding for continued development of CDMA Broadcast
Jul-90 feedback Cascade
Sep-90 Qualcomm senior executive makes series of presentation to Korean government (ETRI and MoC) Cascade
May-91 Qualcomm and ETRI reach Joint development agreement Cascade
Oct-91 Qualcomm distributes Gold Book of CDMA standard specifications to partners / advocates- final document after revisions Cascade
Nov-91 Trial of CDMA in San Diego - full fledged cellular network - in conjunction with PacTel Broadcast
Dec-91 Qualcomm IPO raises $68M Broadcast
Dec-91 Dr Irwin Jacobs CEO of Qualcomm publicly states that "all questions regarding CDMA have been put to rest" Broadcast
Jan-92 CTIA fails to endorse Qualcomm's CDMA Broadcast
Jan-92 Qualcomm CEO Irwin Jacobs publicly states that CDMA will be commercially available in 12 months Broadcast
May-92 Aggressive PR by Qualcomm / PacTel /Motorola targeted at network operators Broadcast
Jun-92 Ameritech launches 18 month market and technology trial of both TDMA and CDMA Broadcast
Aug-92 US West New Vector announce they will adopt CDMA and sign purchase agreements with Motorola and Northern Telecom Broadcast
1992 Qualcomm invests millions in communicating the benefits of CDMA in trade press and industry forums Broadcast
Mar-93 BAMS announces they will use CDMA Broadcast
Mar-93 Pactel and Ameritech support CDMA at CTIA board meeting Cascade
Jun-93 US West claims it will have CDMA up and running in its Seattle market by late 1994 Broadcast
Jul-93 Ameritech backs away from TDMA, claims market and technology trial does not support adoption of TDMA Broadcast
Jul-93 CTIA endorses Qualcomm's CDMA as an interim standard IS-95 Broadcast
Dec-93 CDMA development group formed - 17 companies - press release identifies capacity benefits of CDMA Broadcast
Dec-93 CDMA development group - acts as mechanism for sharing information and building relationships Cascade
Jan-94 Thomas Crawford, Director of marketing at Qualcomm - press release stating "CDMA is ready to go" Broadcast
1994 Qualcomm makes public claims via press releases, news media, speeches regarding the technical superiority of CDMA  Broadcast
Dec-94 Qualcomm and Northern Telecom sign agreement for the joint manufacture of infrastructure equipment for CDMA Cascade
Dec-94 Digital Spectrum Auctions  - $7B raised Broadcast
Jun-95 PCS PrimeCo announce they will use CDMA Broadcast
Jul-95 Sprint Technology Ventures (STV) publicly supports their choice of CDMA Broadcast
Oct-95 Hutchinson Telephone of Hong Kong announces launch of first commercial CDMA network Broadcast
Oct-95 CDMA Broadcast
Dec-95 South Korea announces launch of commercial CDMA network Broadcast
Jan-96 STV requests Motorola to provide last minute financial guarantees in case of system failures  for CDMA roll-out Broadcast
Jan-96 Motorola refuses to provide guarantees to STV; Nortel / Lucent agree to performance guarantees Cascade
Feb-96 Qualcomm claims 10 of top 14 Cellular operators have committed to CDMA Broadcast
Mar-96 CDMA development group announce deployment of CDMA in India, China, Brazil, Indonesia and Russia Broadcast
Nov-96 STV commits to massive launch with CDMA technology prior to year end Broadcast
Nov-96 Primeco announces it will launch service in several markets using CDMA Broadcast
Feb-97 China places $300M order to Qualcomm CDMA phones Broadcast
Qualcomm and CDMA information sharing events / activities 1989 - 1997
 
 
 
 
 7/25/2006   85
Table 7. Information sharing events – detailed version: Ericsson promotes TDMA & GSM 
Timing
Ericsson TDMA/GSM information 
sharing events & activities 1982 - 1997 Message Content
Message 
Complexity Message Intent Media Type Target Media Strategy
1982
Stockholm inaugural meeting for GSM standard - 
representatives from 11 countries
technical and strategic design 
issues complex inform face to face meeting
government & key 
adopters Cascade
1985 Ericsson presents its TDMA based proposal 
technical and strategic design 
issues complex persuade face to face meeting
government & key 
adopters Cascade
1985
system requirements defined, circulated and 
endorsed 
technical and strategic design 
issues complex persuade face to face meeting
government & key 
adopters Cascade
1985 development of technical details for GSM begins
technical and strategic design 
issues complex persuade face to face meeting
government & key 
adopters Cascade
Jun-86
narrowband TDMA design by Ericsson and 
broadband CDMA design by SEL/Alcatel are the 
technical and strategic design 
issues complex persuade face to face meeting
government & key 
adopters Cascade
Oct-86
All parties supporting Ericsson proposal with the 
exception of French and German governments 
technical and strategic design 
issues complex persuade face to face meeting
government & key 
adopters Cascade
Nov-86
Ericsson goes into a cooperation agreement with 
Siemens (German telecommunication 
technical and strategic design 
issues complex persuade face to face meeting single adopter Cascade
Nov-86
Ericsson signs a development agreement with LTC 
(French telephone operator) for the GSM standard 
technical and strategic design 
issues complex persuade face to face meeting single adopter Cascade
Feb-87
GSM standard to be based on Ericsson TDMA 
proposal 
initial support from key 
adopters complex inform face to face meeting
government & key 
adopters Cascade
1987 - 1991 GSM standard details defined operational issues complex inform face to face meeting
government & key 
adopters Cascade
Jan-89
In the U.S. CTIA endorses TDMA version of a 
digital standard based on Ericsson's GSM proposal legitimization of TDMA simple inform press release industry Broadcast
1991
Ericsson continues to publicly state at every 
opportunity their disbelief in the claims being made discredit CDMA simple persuade
speeches, conferences, 
interviews key adopters Broadcast
Feb-91
Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. publicly 
commits to TDMA; orders equipment from Ericsson support from key adopter simple inform press release key adopters Broadcast
Jul-91
Ericsson and GE mobile enter discussions to build 
a dual-mode handset with analog and TDMA final design specifications complex inform written communication key adopters Cascade  
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Timing
Ericsson TDMA/GSM information 
sharing events & activities 1982 - 1997 Message Content
Message 
Complexity Message Intent Media Type Target Media Strategy
Jan-92 CTIA fails to endorse Qualcomm's CDMA investment support simple inform press release public at large Broadcast
Jan-92
Southwestern Bell announces it will order TDMA 
equipment from Ericsson operational readiness simple persuade press release key adopters Broadcast
Feb-92 First GSM handsets receive interim approval for operational readiness simple persuade press release key adopters Broadcast
May-92
Ericsson and GE mobile announce dual-mode 
handset with analog and TDMA technology will be operational readiness simple persuade press release key adopters Broadcast
Aug-92
Ericsson and GE mobile announce delay in launch 
of dual-mode handset with analog and TDMA lack of operational readiness simple inform press release key adopters Broadcast
Nov-92
McCaw Cellular announces it will commit to TDMA 
standard and deploy in Florida markets in early 93 support from key adopter  simple persuade press release key adopters Broadcast
Nov-92 Ericsson and GE mobile launch dual mode handset operational readiness simple persuade press release key adopters Broadcast
1992
Ericsson spends millions to highlight benefits of 
their TDMA and GSM standards in trade press and benefits of technology simple persuade press release key adopters Broadcast
Jul-93
Southwestern Bell launches media blitz for its new 
TDMA based digital service in Chicago infrastructure deployed simple persuade press release
market & key 
adopters Broadcast
Jul-93
Ameritech backs away from TDMA, it announces 
market and technology trial doesn't support limitations of technology simple inform press release key adopters Broadcast
Aug-93 AT&T announces takeover of McCaw Cellular for acquisition of key adopter simple inform press release industry Broadcast
Oct - Dec 93
AT&T with Southwestern Bell send out a torrent of 
attacks in the trade press, at conventions and on discredit CDMA simple persuade
speeches, press releases 
& discussions key adopters Broadcast
Jan-94
MCI announces it will invest $1.3B into Nextel in 
order to get into digital game support from key adopter  simple inform press release industry Broadcast
Mar-94
Ericsson announces development of new intelligent 
base station for GSM standard benefits of technology simple persuade press release key adopters Broadcast
Apr-94
MCI/Nextel announce they will support GSM since 
it is a proven technology that is ready to go support from key adopter  simple persuade press release key adopters Broadcast
Jun-94
Bellsouth announces support for TDMA due to its 
availability and proven performance support from key adopter  simple persuade press release key adopters Broadcast
Dec-94 Digital Spectrum Auctions  - $7B raised triggers industry wide adoption simple inform press release industry Broadcast
Jun - Dec 94 Ericsson releases a series of white papers aimed discredit CDMA simple persuade written communication key adopters Broadcast
Mar-95 American Personal Communications pledges to support from key adopter simple persuade press release key adopters Broadcast
Mar-95
Pacific Bell agrees to $300M deal with Ericsson for 
GSM equipment for deployment in California and support from key adopter simple persuade press release key adopters Broadcast
Nov-96
Omnipoint announces roll out of GSM based 
service support from key adopter simple persuade press release
market & key 
adopters Broadcast
Dec-96
AT&T attempts to pre-empt competitors and 
announces roll out of new digital service based on infrastructure deployed simple inform press release
market & key 
adopters Broadcast
Nov-97
Seven regional GSM carriers announce the North 
American GSM alliance group formation support from key adopters simple inform press release industry Broadcast
Nov-97
Seven regional GSM carriers form the North 
American GSM alliance group 
network of relationships for 
Ericsson complex inform ongoing communcation group members Cascade  
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Table 8. Information sharing events – aggregated version: Ericsson promotes TDMA & GSM 
 
1982 Stockholm inaugural meeting for GSM standard - representatives from 11 countries Cascade
1985 Ericsson presents its TDMA based proposal Cascade
1985 system requirements defined, circulated and endorsed Cascade
1985 development of technical details for GSM begins Cascade
Jun-86 standard Cascade
Oct-86 All parties supporting Ericsson proposal with the exception of French and German governments Cascade
Nov-86 Ericsson goes into a cooperation agreement with Siemens (German telecommunication manufacturer) for the GSM standard Cascade
Nov-86 Ericsson signs a development agreement with LTC (French telephone operator) for the GSM standard based on its TDMA version Cascade
Feb-87 GSM standard to be based on Ericsson TDMA proposal Cascade
1987 - 1991 GSM standard details defined Cascade
Jan-89 In the U.S. CTIA endorses TDMA version of a digital standard based on Ericsson's GSM proposal for the EU Broadcast
1991 Ericsson continues to publicly state at every opportunity their disbelief in the claims being made about CDMA by Qualcomm Broadcast
Feb-91 Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. publicly commits to TDMA; orders equipment from Ericsson Broadcast
Jul-91 Ericsson and GE mobile enter discussions to build a dual-mode handset with analog and TDMA technology Cascade
Jan-92 CTIA fails to endorse Qualcomm's CDMA Broadcast
Jan-92 Southwestern Bell announces it will order TDMA equipment from Ericsson Broadcast
Feb-92 First GSM handsets receive interim approval for global markets Broadcast
May-92 Ericsson and GE mobile announce dual-mode handset with analog and TDMA technology will be available in Aug 1992 Broadcast
Aug-92 Ericsson and GE mobile announce delay in launch of dual-mode handset with analog and TDMA technology until year end Broadcast
Nov-92 McCaw Cellular announces it will commit to TDMA standard and deploy in Florida markets in early 93 Broadcast
Nov-92 Ericsson and GE mobile launch dual mode handset Broadcast
1992 Ericsson spends millions to highlight benefits of their TDMA and GSM standards in trade press and industry forums Broadcast
Jul-93 Southwestern Bell launches media blitz for its new TDMA based digital service in Chicago Broadcast
Jul-93 Ameritech backs away from TDMA, it announces market and technology trial doesn't support adoption of TDMA Broadcast
Aug-93 AT&T announces takeover of McCaw Cellular for $12.6B Broadcast
Oct - Dec 93 AT&T with Southwestern Bell send out a torrent of attacks in the trade press, at conventions and on internet forums against CDMA Broadcast
Jan-94 MCI announces it will invest $1.3B into Nextel in order to get into digital game Broadcast
Mar-94 Ericsson announces development of new intelligent base station for GSM standard Broadcast
Apr-94 MCI/Nextel announce they will support GSM since it is a proven technology that is ready to go Broadcast
Jun-94 Bellsouth announces support for TDMA due to its availability and proven performance Broadcast
Dec-94 Digital Spectrum Auctions  - $7B raised Broadcast
Jun - Dec 94 Ericsson releases a series of white papers aimed at discrediting CDMA Broadcast
Mar-95 American Personal Communications pledges to support GSM standard Broadcast
Mar-95 Pacific Bell agrees to $300M deal with Ericsson for GSM equipment for deployment in California and Nevada markets Broadcast
Nov-96 Omnipoint announces roll out of GSM based service Broadcast
Dec-96 AT&T attempts to pre-empt competitors and announces roll out of new digital service based on TDMA Broadcast
Nov-97 Seven regional GSM carriers announce the North American GSM alliance group formation Broadcast
Nov-97 Seven regional GSM carriers form the North American GSM alliance group Cascade
Ericsson TDMA and GSM information sharing events / activities 1982 - 1997
 
 
 
Timing evidently plays a significant role in a firm’s decision regarding the type of message to be 
communicated, the media chosen for delivery, and therefore the type of information sharing activity.  As 
these information-sharing events are further analyzed, natural breaks appear within the chronological list 
of events and actions based on different characteristics of the message, media, timing, and target.  For 
example, in 1992 we begin to see service providers declare their support for TDMA, GSM, or CDMA.  
Therefore, the message changes to one of postulating support for a choice, the media shifts to more 
broadcast, and the target becomes the market or industry in general and undecided adopters.  Prior to 
this, most of the information-sharing activity was directed at convincing adopters of the technology’s 
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superiority and involved more cascade sharing.  These breaks within the data set facilitate the separation 
or categorization of the actions and events into eras.     
 
 
7.2 INFORMATION SHARING –THREE SIGNIFICANT ERAS 
 
 
Three distinct eras emerge from the data set, each with its own set of characteristics.  The movement 
from era to era is a natural process associated with the technical development and market readiness of 
the technologies.  These eras are defined as follows: 
• Connection Era:  The connection era is characterized by relationship building, mutual interests and 
support solicitation.  Information sharing is directed at a select group of potential influencers or 
those in a powerful position within the standard setting process.  The messages communicated are 
ambiguous and complex.  Technology sponsors represent a dominant portion of the information 
sharing and are seeking compatibility between the anticipated technical abilities of the standard 
and the adopters’ unique environments.  The connection era begins shortly after the start of the 
development phase and continues into the adoption phase.  
• Ego Era:  The ego era is characterized by boasts about a standard’s future abilities.  Grand claims 
and unfavorable comparisons are used to influence the community at large of potential adopters.  
Deliberate messages of fear, uncertainty and doubt are commonly employed to discredit a 
competitive standard.  The messages communicated in this era are less complex than in the 
connection era.  There is a mixture of information being shared by both technology sponsors and 
adopters.  The ego era, though the briefest of the eras, is where the market tips towards one 
standard.  It exists strictly within the adoption phase. 
• Commitment Era: The commitment era is characterized by adopters’ commitment to a particular 
course of action.  Here a shift occurs, with technology adopters representing a dominant portion of 
the information sharing as they select a competing standard and publicly announce their choices. 
The message in this era, as in the ego era, is less complex than in the connection era.    
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Investment occurs, contracts are signed and deployment can begin.  This era begins late in the 
adoption phase and continues into the diffusion phase.   
These eras relate to the 2G standard setting process of Bekkers (2001).  The connection era begins 
with the existence of a technological prototype or design(s), continues with basic technological decisions 
and culminates in technical and market trials.  There exists a high degree of uncertainty regarding the 
future abilities of the technical standards within this era.  This uncertainty requires the gathering of large 
volumes of information in order to facilitate the decision making process.  Technology sponsors dedicate 
significant resources to introducing key actors to the technical possibilities of their own standard and start 
to build relationships that they will rely upon to influence the adoption process.  They wish to legitimize 
the standard in the eyes of key adopters.  This process is characterized by communal competition.  In 
other words, rivalry among competing technology sponsors exists, but at the same time there is a desire 
to gather input from the community of actors on technical, economic and strategic design issues with 
scientific emphasis on developing the most superior technical standards possible.  Firms that share similar 
goals and expectations eventually seek each other, and alliances are formed in order to promote a 
particular standard.  Development agreements are used to share technological expertise and spread the 
risk of failure.  The process of cascade information sharing is beginning.  The end of the connection era is 
signaled through the increase in issues that affect commercialization of the standard(s) and the first signs 
of licensing agreements.    
The ego era begins with the end of the communal competition associated with the connection era.  
Rivalry is now intense.  Firms are signaling their commitment to a particular standard through press 
releases and aggressive PR campaigns.  Broadcast information sharing is predominant. The results of 
technology and market trials are being communicated along with the pros and cons of each standard.  
Commercial service plans are being developed and there are the first signs of credible commitment 
through the announcements of early purchases and procurements of network equipment and handsets.  
There exists a significant amount of noise, with an emphasis on convincing the undecided element.  This 
is where the bandwagon effect begins.  The ego era ends with the first signs of formalized support 
evident in the marketplace.  Firms begin to prefer one standard over another. 
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The commitment era begins in the adoption phase, but also continues into the diffusion phase. In 
this era, as firms choose standards, the degree of noise and rivalry in the environment is reduced, yet 
there remains a high use of broadcast information sharing identifying launch dates and deployment 
schedules.  Here deals are brokered, and importance shifts to financial considerations and 
implementation issues.  Firms shift their focus from convincing other industry actors to persuading the 
end user, and there is a rise of advertisements for new products and services.  It is within this era that 
the market will tend to tip towards one particular standard in the presence of network externalities.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Stages of standard development and eras of information sharing    
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Table 9. Eras of information sharing events: Qualcomm promotes CDMA  
 
SEPARATED INTO ERAS
Jan-89 CTIA endorses TDMA Broadcast
Feb-89 Qualcomm management visit Pactel management - series of meetings ensues throughout 1989 Cascade
Mar-89 Qualcomm management visit Ameritech management Cascade
Apr-89 Qualcomm hires PR firm to develop awareness campaign Broadcast
Apr - Nov 1989 At every industry conference or symposium, Qualcomm sent senior level representatives to speak about CDMA Broadcast
Jun-89 Irwin Jacobs gives presentation at CTIA Broadcast
Jul-89 PacTel agrees to provide $2M to Qualcomm for further development of CDMA Cascade
Jul-89 Qualcomm executives visit NYNEX Cascade
Oct-89 Qualcomm executives visit Ameritech Cascade
Nov-89 Live demonstration at Qualcomm work site, manufacturers and operators attend Broadcast
Dec-89 Qualcomm / PacTel l/ Motorola reach development agreement Cascade
Feb-90 Qualcomm & NYNEX conduct live trial in New York Broadcast
Mar - Sept 1990 AT&T, NYNEX, Ameritech, Motorola and PacTel commit $30M for continued development of CDMA Broadcast
Jul-90 Qualcomm distributes Green Book of CDMA to partners and advocates which outlines standard specifications and invites input and feedback Cascade
Sep-90 Qualcomm senior executive makes series of presentation to Korean government (ETRI and MoC) Cascade
May-91 Qualcomm and ETRI reach Joint development agreement Cascade
Oct-91 Qualcomm distributes Gold Book of CDMA standard specifications to partners / advocates- final document after revisions Cascade
Nov-91 Trial of CDMA in San Diego - full fledged cellular network - in conjunction with PacTel Broadcast
Dec-91 Qualcomm IPO raises $68M Broadcast
Dec-91 Dr Irwin Jacobs CEO of Qualcomm publicly states that "all questions regarding CDMA have been put to rest" Broadcast
Jan-92 CTIA fails to endorse Qualcomm's CDMA Broadcast
Jan-92 Qualcomm CEO Irwin Jacobs publicly states that CDMA will be commercially available in 12 months Broadcast
May-92 Aggressive PR by Qualcomm / PacTel /Motorola targeted at network operators Broadcast
Jun-92 Ameritech launches 18 month market and technology trial of both TDMA and CDMA Broadcast
Aug-92 US West New Vector announce they will adopt CDMA and sign purchase agreements with Motorola and Northern Telecom Broadcast
1992 Qualcomm invests millions in communicating the benefits of CDMA in trade press and industry forums Broadcast
Mar-93 BAMS announces they will use CDMA Broadcast
Mar-93 Pactel and Ameritech support CDMA at CTIA board meeting Cascade
Jun-93 US West claims it will have CDMA up and running in its Seattle market by late 1994 Broadcast
Jul-93 Ameritech backs away from TDMA, claims market and technology trial does not support adoption of TDMA Broadcast
Jul-93 CTIA endorses Qualcomm's CDMA as an interim standard IS-95 Broadcast
Dec-93 CDMA development group formed - 17 companies - press release identifies capacity benefits of CDMA Broadcast
Dec-93 CDMA development group - acts as mechanism for sharing information and building relationships Cascade
Jan-94 Thomas Crawford, Director of marketing at Qualcomm - press release stating "CDMA is ready to go" Broadcast
1994 Qualcomm makes public claims via press releases, news media, speeches regarding the technical superiority of CDMA  Broadcast
Dec-94 Qualcomm and Northern Telecom sign agreement for the joint manufacture of infrastructure equipment for CDMA Cascade
Dec-94 Digital Spectrum Auctions  - $7B raised Broadcast
Jun-95 PCS PrimeCo announce they will use CDMA Broadcast
Jul-95 Sprint Technology Ventures (STV) publicly supports their choice of CDMA Broadcast
Oct-95 Hutchinson Telephone of Hong Kong announces launch of first commercial CDMA network Broadcast
Oct-95 Qualcomm claims that Sprint, GTE, Ameritech, AirTouch, Bell Atlantic, NYNEX and US West are all committed to the commercial use of Broadcast
Dec-95 South Korea announces launch of commercial CDMA network Broadcast
Jan-96 STV requests Motorola to provide last minute financial guarantees in case of system failures  for CDMA roll-out Broadcast
Jan-96 Motorola refuses to provide guarantees to STV; Nortel / Lucent agree to performance guarantees Cascade
Feb-96 Qualcomm claims 10 of top 14 Cellular operators have committed to CDMA Broadcast
Mar-96 CDMA development group announce deployment of CDMA in India, China, Brazil, Indonesia and Russia Broadcast
Nov-96 STV commits to massive launch with CDMA technology prior to year end Broadcast
Oct-96 Primeco announces it will launch service in several markets using CDMA Broadcast
Feb-97 China places $300M order to Qualcomm for CDMA phones Broadcast
Qualcomm and CDMA information sharing events / activities 1989 - 1997
EGO ERA
CONNECTION ERA
COMMITMENT ERA
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Table 10.  Eras of information sharing events: Ericsson promotes TDMA & GSM 
SEPARATED INTO ERAS
1982 Stockholm inaugural meeting for GSM standard - representatives from 11 countries Cascade
1985 Ericsson presents its TDMA based proposal Cascade
1985 system requirements defined, circulated and endorsed Cascade
1985 development of technical details for GSM begins Cascade
Jun-86 standard Cascade
Oct-86 All parties supporting Ericsson proposal with the exception of French and German governments Cascade
Nov-86 Ericsson goes into a cooperation agreement with Siemens (German telecommunication manufacturer) for the GSM standard Cascade
Nov-86 Ericsson signs a development agreement with LTC (French telephone operator) for the GSM standard based on its TDMA version Cascade
Feb-87 GSM standard to be based on Ericsson TDMA proposal Cascade
1987 - 1991 GSM standard details defined Cascade
Jan-89 In the U.S. CTIA endorses TDMA version of a digital standard based on Ericsson's GSM proposal for the EU Broadcast
1991 Ericsson continues to publicly state at every opportunity their disbelief in the claims being made about CDMA by Qualcomm Broadcast
Feb-91 Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. publicly commits to TDMA; orders equipment from Ericsson Broadcast
Jul-91 Ericsson and GE mobile enter discussions to build a dual-mode handset with analog and TDMA technology Cascade
Jan-92 CTIA fails to endorse Qualcomm's CDMA Broadcast
Jan-92 Southwestern Bell announces it will order TDMA equipment from Ericsson Broadcast
Feb-92 First GSM handsets receive interim approval for global markets Broadcast
May-92 Ericsson and GE mobile announce dual-mode handset with analog and TDMA technology will be available in Aug 1992 Broadcast
Aug-92 Ericsson and GE mobile announce delay in launch of dual-mode handset with analog and TDMA technology until year end Broadcast
Nov-92 McCaw Cellular announces it will commit to TDMA standard and deploy in Florida markets in early 93 Broadcast
Nov-92 Ericsson and GE mobile launch dual mode handset Broadcast
1992 Ericsson spends millions to highlight benefits of their TDMA and GSM standards in trade press and industry forums Broadcast
Jul-93 Southwestern Bell launches media blitz for its new TDMA based digital service in Chicago Broadcast
Jul-93 Ameritech backs away from TDMA, it announces market and technology trial doesn't support adoption of TDMA Broadcast
Aug-93 AT&T announces takeover of McCaw Cellular for $12.6B Broadcast
Oct - Dec 93 AT&T with Southwestern Bell send out a torrent of attacks in the trade press, at conventions and on internet forums against CDMA Broadcast
Jan-94 MCI announces it will invest $1.3B into Nextel in order to get into digital game Broadcast
Mar-94 Ericsson announces development of new intelligent base station for GSM standard Broadcast
Apr-94 MCI/Nextel announce they will support GSM since it is a proven technology that is ready to go Broadcast
Jun-94 Bellsouth announces support for TDMA due to its availability and proven performance Broadcast
Dec-94 Digital Spectrum Auctions  - $7B raised Broadcast
Jun - Dec 94 Ericsson releases a series of white papers aimed at discrediting CDMA Broadcast
Mar-95 American Personal Communications pledges to support GSM standard Broadcast
Mar-95 Pacific Bell agrees to $300M deal with Ericsson for GSM equipment for deployment in California and Nevada markets Broadcast
Nov-96 Omnipoint announces roll out of GSM based service Broadcast
Dec-96 AT&T attempts to pre-empt competitors and announces roll out of new digital service based on TDMA Broadcast
Nov-97 Seven regional GSM carriers announce the North American GSM alliance group formation Broadcast
Nov-97 Seven regional GSM carriers form the North American GSM alliance group Cascade
Ericsson TDMA and GSM information sharing events / activities 1982 - 1997
CONNECTION ERA
EGO ERA
COMMITMENT ERA
 
 
 
Tables 9 and 10 display the same set of information sharing events as Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 but 
with the eras identified.   
Figure 10 displays the compilation of information sharing events for all three standards, separated 
by broadcast or cascade and displayed according to frequency within the eras.  The highest instances of 
cascade information sharing occur in the connection era and that these instances of cascade information 
sharing decline as we enter the ego and commitment eras. The use of broadcast information sharing 
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peaks in the ego era, but there is also much evidence of its continued use throughout the commitment 
era.    
 
Figure 10. Incidence of cascade and broadcast information sharing 
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Throughout the study period, both Ericsson and Qualcomm employed a combination of broadcast 
and cascade information sharing techniques, with the focus in the connection era on the use of 
information cascades.  In the initial years of the standard development phase, when the technical, 
economic and strategic design issues were being decided and the communication of Qualcomm’s 
message was new and complex, we see a heavier preponderance on the reliance of strong ties or 
relationship cascades to promote CDMA.  Qualcomm’s senior management team identifies and 
undertakes face-to-face meetings with key adopters like PacTel, Ameritech and Nynex.  These meetings 
more than once and relationships build between the involved parties.  As proof of these relationships and 
the ability to describe them as strong ties, PacTel enters into development agreements for CDMA with 
Qualcomm.  This type of arrangement requires close contact and regular updates between parties.  Also 
Qualcomm and Nynex conduct a joint live trial of CDMA.  This activity would also require frequent contact 
between parties and the delivery of complex technical information.  Ericsson also relies on its network of 
strong ties to finalize the development and acceptance of both standards it supports.  In the connection 
era for CMDA, 50% of the identified information sharing activities was cascade.   
For Ericsson this percentage is even higher – over 75%.  Here the evidence of strong ties also lies 
in the use of development and cooperation agreements with Siemens and LTC for the further 
development of the technology.  In the U.S. scenario, the early support by the CTIA for TDMA is surely 
propagated on the delivery of complex information regarding the technology.  Even though direct 
evidence does not exist in this analysis, it seems logical to conclude that gaining approval by the CTIA 
would require frequent interactions between members of the CTIA and Ericsson.  Thus a strong tie most 
likely existed here as well.   By 1991, near the end of the connection era, the instances of cascade 
sharing decline drastically and there is a shift towards the predominant use of broadcast for both 
technology sponsors.  Since the process of cascades involves identifying a few key adopters who 
legitimize the innovation and then through their support, drive more widespread adoption, it was 
important for Qualcomm to locate a group of network operators it could build relationships with that 
allowed for ongoing direct contact through strong ties for the necessary education and acceptance of 
CDMA.  The support of these operators would influence others to support CDMA. Since one adopter can 
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tip the balance, and obtaining timely access to adopters is so critical, it might seem that technology 
sponsors must be everywhere at the same time.  However this is where the process of information 
cascades is most effective.  Even though Qualcomm sought out relationships with PacTel, Ameritech and 
Nynex, the actions and support of these service providers was also critical in influencing others to select 
the CDMA standard. 
As both firms entered the ego era in 1992, the use of cascade information sharing has all but 
yielded to broadcast information sharing.  Again in the commitment era, there is little cascade 
information sharing, accounting for less than 15% of information sharing events by the two sponsors 
combined.  Information sharing in the commitment era is no longer being generated by the technology 
sponsors, and instead is almost solely coming from adopters as they proclaim their support.  Here the tie 
strength between sponsors and adopters is primarily weak as intermediaries are managing the transfer of 
information in these eras.     
Other indicators that may assist firms in distinguishing between eras, or recognizing which era they 
might be participating in, are licensing and development agreements.  This process of era recognition is 
certainly useful for a firm since the eras provide insights into where along the standard setting process 
the industry currently is.  This information could assist in enhancing the strategic actions of both sponsors 
and adopter firms who are participating in the standard contest.  For sponsors, it would allow them to 
recognize and apply the most befitting information sharing for a particular point in time.  For adopters, it 
could signal to them the market viability of a particular choice and thus reduce the risk associated with an 
improper selection. 
Figure 11 displays the frequency of development and licensing agreements evident within the 2G 
standards process distributed according to eras.  Since development of the technological standard 
primarily occurs within the connection era, it is here that the greatest numbers of development 
agreements are announced.  One potential indicator that allows firms to recognize that the standards 
contest is moving into the ego era is the increased incidence of licensing agreements, which indicates 
that the standard is nearing both technological and market readiness.  Firms begin to demonstrate their 
commitment to adopt a standard as early as the latter portion of the connection era, and this continues 
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throughout the ego and commitment eras.  Adoptions peak in the commitment era and decline toward 
the end of the standard battle. If a firm was tracking market activity, it could use the intensity of 
adoptions as a gauge to assist in identifying which point in the standard setting process they are at.  In 
addition, evidence of both licensing and development agreements would also support this ability.         
 
Figure 8. Indicators of size and influence 
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Figure 11. Factors affecting the standards process 
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8.0 DISCUSSION 
 
 
In this paper I develop a model of information sharing for use in a technical market based standards 
process.  It extends previous work on how a firm can influence the outcome of a standards contest and 
combines aspects of the literature on diffusion and social networks with traditional standard setting 
knowledge.  Previously much of the literature on standard setting and network externalities focused on 
timing of entry and management of expectations.  Likewise, the literature on technology diffusion 
recognized the importance of effective communication to increasing the speed of technology adoption.   
Social network theory effectively deals with the strength of relationships and how these influence the 
delivery of information.  The model I develop extends these concepts further through their application to 
a standards setting process and introduces a new focus on how the use of strategic sharing of 
information can impact the rate of adoption and thus alter the outcome of a standards contest.   
The results of this single case study suggest that firms use information to influence adopters’ 
expectations regarding a technical standard.  They are aware of this activity, called information sharing, 
and objectively apply it as a strategic tool within a de-facto standards contest.  Further, it seems 
apparent that firms rely more heavily on cascade information sharing during the early stages of a 
standard’s development in a market based contest.   Here the information being shared consists of 
awareness knowledge, how-to knowledge and principles knowledge (Rogers, 1995).    Bekker (2001) 
classifies this as the development phase of the standard setting process.  In my focus on information 
sharing, I label it the connection era.  Here the sharing takes place through strong or direct ties and 
requires relationships for the transfer of the complex and ambiguous information (rich-media) associated 
with technical, economic and strategic design issues of the standard.  In contrast to this, firms rely more 
heavily on broadcast information sharing during the adoption and diffusion stages of Bekkers (2001), 
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which I link to ego and commitment eras.  Broadcast information sharing takes place over weak or 
indirect ties and delivers a straightforward message of technical superiority and market support.  The 
message here emphasizes the credibility and merits of the technology and commitment to a irreversible 
path.  It is interesting that within this era we see information sharing being instigated by both sponsors 
and adopters as they communicate trial results, generate advertisements, announce support through 
purchase agreements for infrastructure and service launches.   
Beyond confirming the relevance of the information sharing process in a standards context, this 
study also indicates the possibility of how certain characteristics of the firm and the standard impact a 
chosen information sharing strategy.  Ericsson, the incumbent in the market, initially supporting an 
evolutionary standard, employed a campaign of information sharing directed at creating fear, uncertainty 
and doubt (FUD).  It attempted to create noise in the environment and add confusion into the selection 
process for adopters. Much of its communication involved comparisons between competing standards, 
identifying its standard’s strengths versus the competing standard’s weaknesses.  In addition, Ericsson 
publicly discounted claims made by Qualcomm regarding the benefits of CDMA.  Ericsson also possessed 
a strong reputation for quality and innovativeness in the industry.  Therefore it invested less time in 
sharing information regarding its abilities.  Qualcomm, a new entrant advocating a revolutionary standard 
that was considered technically superior, avoided negative comparisons and instead focused its message 
on its own standard’s advantages.  In general, its message was a positive one that evaded the negativity 
associated with Ericsson’s message.  Qualcomm did not have a strong reputation in the industry and this 
required information sharing that lent support to its credibility. The funding support obtained from PacTel 
and Motorola is an example of an action that improved Qualcomm’s reputation.  It is difficult to fully 
comprehend why these two firms undertook a different approach, however, Ericsson’s FUD campaign was 
probably an attempt to exploit its strong reputation against the unknown factor that Qualcomm 
represented.  Qualcomm recognized its weak position in the network of manufacturers and network 
operators and chose to avoid confronting Ericsson’s directly.  Instead, Qualcomm focused on delivery of a 
repetitious message designed to highlight the advantages of CDMA, and as some commentary suggests, 
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designed to exaggerate the anticipated technical capabilities of CDMA in an attempt to build early support 
for the standard. 
Another possible rationale for the difference in the context of the messages chosen by these firms 
is enmeshed in the technical capability and degree of radical change surrounding each technology.  The 
evolutionary nature of TDMA placed Ericsson in a preemptory position in the market place.  Ericsson may 
have assumed, and rightly so, that adopters would be inclined towards a standard that required minimal 
upgrade to infrastructure and was based on commonly accepted principles of design.  Since TDMA was 
an evolutionary technology, adopters would require less information in their selection process.  Adding to 
this sense of confidence would have been the certification of TDMA by the CTIA.  These conditions could 
have provided Ericsson with a false sense of security regarding TDMA’s adoption in the U.S. market and 
may have been responsible for Ericsson’s slow start in an attempt to thwart claims made by Qualcomm 
regarding CDMA.lxvi  When TDMA’s subordinate technical abilities became evident, Ericsson was left with 
little choice than to use public doubt and disbelief to discount the superiority claims being advanced by 
Qualcomm.       
The revolutionary nature of CDMA required overcoming the obstacles presented by adopters’ 
requirement to replace much of their current infrastructure.  Undertaking an overhaul of this nature  
would require an expectation that CDMA would encompass exceptional technical potential.  Radical 
technologies require significant information sharing by adopters.  Since Qualcomm recognized this, its use 
of grand claims throughout all three eras, but intensifying in the ego era, suggests that the revolutionary 
nature of CDMA along with its technical advantages was responsible for the type of information sharing 
strategy that Qualcomm employed.lxvii  
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9.0 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
Standard setting is a complex process where many factors can influence the outcome.  From a theoretical 
perspective, the most apparent implication of this study is that information sharing does matter.  Firms 
participating in a technical standards contest can adopt information sharing as a strategic tool to 
positively influence the outcome and thus the overall success of an organization.  This finding supports 
other theoretical conclusions put forward in the literature on diffusion and adoption, standards, and social 
network theory and extends this body of work through the introduction of information sharing as a key 
strategic tool.  As identified by other scholars, timing associated with market actions and events, 
especially in markets characterized by externalities, can lead to excess inertia causing the market to tip 
towards one dominant standard (Farrell & Saloner, 1986).  This notion is also related to the concept of 
obtaining critical mass, derived from the technology diffusion literature.  When a sufficient number of 
adopters have selected a technology to allow further adoption to be self-sustaining, a situation of critical 
mass occurs (Rogers, 2003).  Finally, there exists much work surrounding tie strength and information 
delivery, suggesting that strong or direct ties are more apt for the delivery of complex and ambiguous 
information, while weak or indirect ties are better equipped to deliver simpler, less complex messages.  
The results of this case study support these conclusions and suggest that timing of information sharing 
when undertaken through the appropriate media can assist a firm in attaining a dominant standard.  If 
firms can develop and implement an information-sharing strategy, they potentially can improve their 
chances of success in a standards contest.   
In addition, it appears that there exist some moderating effects associated with firm characteristics 
like size and reputation and the degree of revolutionary change a technology requires.  The influence of 
firm size has traditionally been recognized in the literature on innovation as a determinant of innovative 
ability, with R&D intensity used as a measure of innovative effort.  Other firm characteristics such as cash 
flow and degree of diversification have been considered as possible explanations of R&D ability and thus 
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innovative capability (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989).  However, unlike the revolutionary nature of the 
technical standard itself, where compatibility between a technical standard and the current technology 
influences the firm’s choice of strategy when it wages a standards war (Shapiro & Varian, 1999), less 
research exists on how firm size and reputation affect firms’ actions in a standards contest.  Since much 
of the standards literature focuses on the market conditions that lead to dominant standards, this 
research introduces a perspective that warrants further exploration – how differences in firm 
characteristics affect a firm’s deciding what actions, activities, and strategy to undertake in a standards 
contest.   
These findings enrich the discussion on standard setting and suggest that other factors potentially 
affect the outcome of a standards contest.  Further research should attempt to extend this model to 
ensure its application across other industry settings and determine if other factors or conditions should be 
added that affect how information is shared in technical standard setting.  For example, one area that 
would benefit from further investigation is how firm characteristics play a role in the choice of 
information-sharing strategy and how firms can use the information they possess to offset disadvantages 
like Qualcomm’s relatively small size and nebulous reputation or Ericsson’s relatively static culture.  In 
addition, since the focus of this paper is on the information-sharing activities of firms in a market based 
or de-facto standards process, it would be enlightening to undertake a study that investigates the use of 
strategic information sharing in a committee-based process, comparing and contrasting the similarities 
and differences associated with each type.  For instance, would the mix of cascade versus broadcast 
information sharing significantly change in a committee-based process?  One would expect so, but there 
would remain the question of the degree that the relationship between the two would be altered.  
Another question to explore would be whether a shift might be primarily due to the environmental 
conditions of a committee-based process or to firm-related characteristics.  Also worth investigating is the 
definition of what constitutes a winner as it relates to standards contests with multiple competing 
technologies.  Since market share tends to be not as relevant in these instances, it would be valuable to 
identify what other measures firms could use to understand the viability of a particular standard. 
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The implications of this model should be of great interest to managers.  Convincing key adopters is 
recognized as an important component of obtaining a dominant standard, so advocates of a technical 
standard would benefit from an understanding of how information sharing can be used to advance that 
end.  On the other hand, adoption of a technical standard is a decision steeped in risk and uncertainty.  If 
managers who are seeking to adopt can increase their awareness of the eras associated with the 
standards process, they may be better able to make judgments regarding a standard’s potential to be 
dominant.  In either case, an enhanced understanding of how information sharing affects the outcome of 
standard setting benefits the industry overall. 
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10.0 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
 
The first potential limitation of this study is a lack of external validity due to the single case study 
approach that was selected and that the results are difficult to generalize beyond the 2G standard setting 
process in the wireless industry in the United States.  However, the nature of the information sharing 
data itself limits the type of study that can be undertaken in this context.  A longitudinal qualitative 
research project might be the only way to substantively identify the outcome of a firm’s information 
sharing actions.  The study does provide insights into factors that impact the outcome of technical 
standard setting, and with further research that includes more comprehensive sampling into other 
industries and situations, the results might be duplicated and thus become more generalizable. 
The second study limitation deals with the degree that cascade information sharing events are 
publicly known and those secondary sources supporting their existence are available to the researcher.  
Cascade events are based on relationships and direct imparting of information between individuals.  
Unlike broadcast events, which by their use of intermediaries are generally available and easily gathered 
through secondary sources, cascade events are more difficult to identify and locate evidence of.  
Therefore, there may be instances of cascade information sharing that could not be identified for this 
study’s data set..  However, there is no evidence to suggest that there are a significant number of 
unidentified cascade events.  In order for the study results to be substantively altered, there would have 
to exist a significant trove of cascade information sharing events that if discovered, would suggest that 
the information sharing trends identified and discussed in this analysis were in err. Since this evidence 
has not come to light as of yet, I believe it is safe to assume that it is possible but not highly probable 
that instances of cascade information sharing remain unaccounted for within this standards contest, but 
highly unlikely that enough exist to alter the set of conclusions gathered.               
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As previously discussed, a standards process is inherently complex, and many factors potential 
influence the outcome.  This study, although offering insights into firm-related factors that potentially 
influence a technical standards process, does not attempt to offer conclusive evidence that information 
sharing alone answers our quest to ascertain the complete rationale behind technology selection in a 
standards contest.  Many factors, both environmental and firm-related, interact in the selection of a 
dominant standard. 
Finally, the final study limitation involves the data collection and interpretation process.  At this 
point in time, the data has been only interpreted by me and therefore some degree of personal bias 
might be present in the collection and assessment of the information sharing events collected.  This can 
be rectified by having a second coder check the internal reliability of the process in the future. 
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11.0 CONCLUSION 
 
 
This paper presents a model of the information sharing process that firms undergo in a technical market 
based standards contest.  The research design consists of a longitudinal examination of the United States 
standards contest for second generation wireless service. The results of this study provide insights into a 
set of factors that influence the outcome of these contests.  They identify that the process of information 
sharing is one method that can be used to influence key adopters and thus the outcome of the contest. 
They also suggest that this is a strategic activity undertaken by firms and entails a series of actions and 
events over an extended duration of time.  Two primary types of information sharing were identified: 
cascade and broadcast.  These were found to commonly occur over different types of network ties with 
each type best suited for the delivery of its own unique message.  The timing of delivery was determined 
to be consequential in the effectiveness of the information sharing process, and the complexity of the 
message content was seen to shape and govern the choice of media for delivery.  Three separate eras 
were defined in order to assist in the appreciation of the strategic process that firms undertake in the 
sharing of important and influential information.          
Further research is required in order to increase the generalizability of this research.  Testing this 
model in the context of different standards processes and different industries is necessary to improve the 
external validity of the study.  In addition, further research could extend the model developed by this 
study to ensure its comprehensiveness and explore whether other conditions exist that should be added 
to the model.  Certain firm-related factors along with revolutionary nature of the technical standards were 
presented as potentially being important aspects of the overall process of information sharing.  Further 
exploration of these areas is also warranted to determine their impact on the process of technical 
standard setting.      
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The literature on standard setting has focused on the environmental factors that influence the 
outcome of a standard contest.  This research supports a more recent trend in the literature that seeks to 
understand how firm-related factors interact with environmental conditions in order to influence the 
selection of a dominant standard.  This study also combines key findings from three separate streams of 
literature: standard setting, technology diffusion and social networks, with the intent of creating a more 
comprehensive set of factors that can be relied upon to further our understanding of technology 
selection. 
Finally, the issue of technology selection as it relates to standard setting is far from fully 
understood.  I have suggested a new strategy choice exists for firms that are attempting to influence the 
outcome of a standards contest.  This strategy choice reflects the process of information sharing as it 
relates to the contest of the message, the choice of media for delivery, the target of influence and the 
timing of delivery.  Further research in this area may be able to extend the framework presented in the 
paper and answer additional questions concerning the comprehensiveness and external validity of these 
conclusions. 
 
                                                 
i In the case of 2nd Generation wireless, 4 standards are now reduced to 2, CDMA & GSM.  As developers and service 
providers begin the move to 3rd Generation wireless, the battle is clearly still evident.  However through constant 
improvements to interoperability across standards, the battle may never end in a single winner.  Both standards 
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